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ABSTRACT

ELLEN, HANNAH The Feminist Pursuit of Happiness: An Analysis of Feminist and
Freudian Theories of Individualistic and Communalistic Pleasure and Joy

ADVISOR: Professor Lori J. Marso

“What do Women Want?” My thesis asks whether women can genuinely seek freedom
while also hoping for happiness. I look closely at how male theorists define happiness and liberty
for themselves and for others, and in particular for feminized others. My two central chapters
focus on theories of individual happiness, happiness sought through another or others, and the
ways feminist thinkers reimagine happiness in relationship to women’s freedom. I apply feminist
critiques to the concept of psychodynamic therapy as an anti-revolutionary tool designed to
isolate and silence women into believing that coping with oppression is equivalent to genuine
happiness. I argue that internal mental readjustment is a result of male-designed structures which
force women to be happy with what makes men happy. Throughout, I engage the work of
thinkers such as Sigmund Freud, Shulamith Firestone, Emma Goldman, Sarah Ahmed, Virginia
Woolf, and Simone de Beauvoir.
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Introduction
In the U.S., happiness has been presented as an ideal, a goal so elusive, so magical that
one was truly successful and free if they were happy. Thomas Jefferson’s inclusion of the pursuit
of happiness as one of the three most significant inalienable rights in our Constitution shows the
link between freedom and happiness and just how important happiness is for those fighting for
political progression. But what about the unhappy? The ones who are still unhappy even after
they have tried or acquired everything that is promised to make one happy? They go to therapy.
Freud’s famous question, “What do women want?” reflects a male ignorance and shallow
question. Feminist authors such as Shulamith Firestone, Sarah Ahmed, and Jill Filipovic look
into how men are not perplexed by the complexity of women’s needs; they just never cared
enough to simply ask what could be done or changed to make women happier.
In psychodynamic therapy, women are stripped from their own concepts of individual
happiness and unhappiness as they are encouraged to find ways to turn their unhappiness into
superficial happiness so as to cope within the existing patriarchal society. This internal
readjustment may be temporarily satisfying but causes the female psychoanalysis patient to
become distracted from the root of her unhappiness; societal inequality stemming from familial
inequality. Clinical psychoanalysis also alienates women from their fellow feminists, preventing
women from engaging in communal consciousness raising about the ways in which patriarchy
limits each of their pursuits of genuine happiness in similar ways. By depoliticizing this matter in
a one on one setting with a psychotherapist, the woman is made to question why she cannot be
happy with what she should be happy with and her inability to do so is formulated as her own
fault. Sarah Ahmed discusses this as happiness alienation. Additionally, clinical psychotherapy
pulls the female patient towards a concept of societally shared happiness, one which should
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please all the people in her life as well as herself but in reality, is a brand approved by men
which does not truly represent nor prioritize women’s needs.
By placing Shulamith Firestone into conversation with Sigmund Freud, with supporting
evidence from the works of Jill Filopovic and Sarah Ahmed, I will discuss the role of the
feminist pursuit of happiness within the opposing forces of Freudianism and feminism. In the
1940s, Freudianism succeeded in overpowering feminism because of its alienating isolation of
women from each other, its counterrevolutionary clinical solutions to feminist pursuits of
individual happiness, and its appeal as an objective and legitimate applied science in comparison
to feminism as a subjective political movement. Firestone purports that Freudian psychotherapy
is a systemic subjugation of women’s individual pursuit of genuine happiness but is framed as a
solution for both unhappy feminists and threatened men. In addition to an introduction on the
relationship between happiness sought within feminism and an alleviation to unhappiness sought
within Freudianism, the question of happiness will be approached in two sections.
The first will analyze how women seek happiness on their own and how psychotherapy
and education are presented as more viable, sustainable, and legitimate pathways than feminist
political engagement. For this section, collective happiness will be looked at as a patriarchal
construction which is framed as that which must be protected from those who are not happy with
this exclusionary happiness. The second section will be on how women seek happiness through
others in both a Freudian and feminist perspective. By looking at love, marriage, sex, and
motherhood, the ways in which women resign to Freudianism as a solution, become participants
in their own oppression, and sacrifice their happiness for others will be analyzed. The third and
final section will be on how women seek happiness in a feminist manner. By analyzing female
friendship, feminist revolution, and a rejection of Freudianism, collective happiness will be
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redefined as a way to fight for the happiness for all marginalized people. This genuine happiness
can only be acquired through revolution of the current system. By killing concepts of patriarchal
collective joy, the concept of the feminist killjoy will no longer exist.

Individualistic Pursuit of and Promise of Happiness
Originally, Freudian theory focused on the freedom of the individual through internal
investigation of trauma through psychoanalysis. Shulamith Firestone argues that in order to be
widely adopted as a viable alternative to feminism, which was rising with popularity at a
threatening rate, Freudianism was modified into an anti-revolutionary clinical solution to
women’s pursuit of individual happiness through feminism. Ahmed’s concept of societally
shared happiness which pleases men closely resembles the anti-revolutionary alternative to
feminism which Freud’s modified psychoanalysis aimed to preserve. In essence, clinical
psychoanalysis served as a tool to subdue the masses of unhappy women who were left high, dry,
and confused about where to go next following the granting of the vote, via the nineteenth
amendment.
Firestone explains how “Freudianism subsumed the place of feminism as the lesser of
two evils [despite the fact that] … both at once were responses to centuries of increasing
privatization of family life, its extreme subjugation of women, and the sex repressions and
subsequent neuroses this causes” (56). While both feminism and Freudianism presented theories
which fundamentally criticized mainstream societal structure, feminism, in its political promise,
left women dissatisfied when they were unable to also make broader sociopolitical and personal
progressions in addition to securing voting rights. Firestone explains, “Following the…granting
of the vote, came the era of the flappers, an era …[of]… pseudo-liberated sexuality” in that
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women became ignited with hope for equality on all fronts but were merely granted the limited
right to vote in a political system created and controlled by men who were still able to intimidate
and suppress women in all aspects of public and private life (57). Legal guarantee of rights did
not do much in terms of de facto sex discrimination and the biggest offender; female dependency
as a result of their lack of control over birth. “They were told then as we are still told now,
‘You’ve got civil rights, short skirts, and sexual liberty. You’ve won your revolution. What more
do you want?’ But the ‘revolution’ had been won within a system organized around the
patriarchal nuclear family” and these achievements were strategically granted to quell women for
the time being (Firestone 57).
The danger now for this group of women who “no longer had a political direction for
their frustration” was that they were now vulnerable to male gas lighting, as well as what would
soon come; psychoanalysis to make the driven yet misguided girl both smiley and marriage
material (57). Women were incredibly confused about where to go next given the fact that
feminists had been using similar vernacular weaponized by patriarchal institutions and clinically
applied Freudianism. Second Wave feminism focused on what Ahmed calls in “Killing Joy:
Feminism and the History of Happiness,” “happy objects” or objects promised to grant not only
an alleviation to suffering but also access to what men had; the happiness and contentment that
comes with full freedom to act and make decisions which impact society for the greater good.
The vote represents an abstract happy object but when women were not granted immediate
happiness as a result, the confused, disturbed, lost, and disappointed feeling that followed would
fall into what Ahmed calls the experience of “happiness alienation.” Women’s demand for a
single item, something they could all agree on, was used by men as grounds for making women
feel insane and radical for still wanting more.
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Firestone introduces the theories of Herbert Marcuse to demonstrate how despite
promises that certain objects, processes, or relationships may grant joy, true happiness and sexual
freedom for women are in fact impossible within an oppressive system. She holds that they are
only falsely granted to exploit and capitalize off of the marginalized. Marcuse in Eros and
Civilization explains “Repressive de-sublimation…[whereas]…In a repressive society, individual
happiness and productive development are in contradiction to society; if they are defined as
values to be realized within the society, they become themselves repressive” (Marcuse cited in
Firestone 57). Within a patriarchal society, which represses the rights of women and feminized
individuals (i.e. children and queer folk), true individual happiness for everyone is neither
possible nor a true goal of this society. In other words, the inclusion of all, for the sake of
progressive political development, is not actually key to the preservation of this type of society.
In a polis like the United States, in which the pursuit of happiness is not only defined as a
key value but as a right, individual happiness can become something repressive, something
granted to some and falsely advertised as a viable option to the less fortunate. Furthermore, the
expectation itself that all strive for happiness is repressive in that despite happiness being more
difficult to achieve by marginalized classes, races, and women, the illusion of social mobility
punishes the unhappy for not trying hard enough and guilt’s them into cooperation and
accommodation to appear non-threatening to the ruling class. In order for individual happiness, a
goal of feminism, to exist within our society without disassembling any of its exploitative
systems or structures, Freudianism was applied in a clinical setting to train women to be happy
enough with patriarchal collective happiness and their own oppression. Collective happiness is
defined as being an ideal which men believe brings joy to all simply because it brings joy to
them. This privileged position dictates one’s perspective and limits it to being one which is so

6
exclusive, narcissistic, and dominant, that the reality of other’s pain at the expense of their
happiness is unthinkable.
Moreover, Firestone presents Marcuse’s theory on happiness within a repressive society
to show how women’s individual pursuit of happiness is a threat because it does not always
match men’s expectations of women want nor what men want for women. This disconnect
between women’s unhappiness and men’s frustration with women not being happy with the little
they had been given played a large role in the development of psychoanalytic therapy. Sarah
Ahmed describes in “Killing Joy: Feminism and the History of Happiness” the way in which
“Beauvoir shows us how description can become a defense: you describe as happy a situation
that you wish to defend. Happiness translates its wish into a politics, a wishful politics, a politics
that demands that others live according to a wish. When a happiness wish is deposited, a social
norm becomes a social good” (572). Men defended what made them happy by extending it to all.
They expected others to accommodate their needs and because our society is built on the
individual pursuit of happiness as a God-given rights, personal needs which hurt others are
allowed and protected if presented as required components of one’s happiness quest. What men
describe as good for them has been wrongfully taken as good for all. Happiness is considered
sacred in our history, described by philosophers throughout time as what “gives meaning,
purpose, and order to human existence” yet is difficult to secure, given its unpredictable nature,
originating from the word “hap, suggesting chance” or “luck” (Ahmed 572, 574). Due to the fact
that happiness is so coveted because no one can concretely identify it, control or preserve it, once
a situation or object has led to happiness, people desperately protect and defend this situation or
object believed to grant happiness. More specifically, white men are frequently the ones making
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decisions about collective good and which institutions to protect due to the fact that they grant
the privileged members of society consistent joy.
Ahmed cites Betty Friedan’s The Feminist Mystique as evidence of the oppressive aspects
of the institution of marriage, propagated by men as one which made women happy, with
oppressive, male-serving duties framed as the women’s pleasure to fulfill. When women
admitted that housewifery was a prison, men were shocked because the false reality they had
believed in, which had been upheld by women’s cooperation, was burst and when happiness is
spoiled, the spoiler becomes the faulted in the eyes of the suddenly unhappy. Ahmed writes,
“The happy housewife is a fantasy figure that erases the signs of labor under the sign of
happiness. The claim that…this happiness is behind the work they do functions to justify
gendered forms of labor not as products of nature, law, or duty, but as expressions of a collective
wish and desire” (573). This very framework places the responsibility behind the unequal
gendered makeup not in the hands of sexist husbands nor a sexist capitalist workforce which
benefits off of women’s unpaid labor but in the hands of women. It makes the point that women
aren’t just happy and content with their oppression as housewives but that they wished for it or
even begged for it to begin with. As will be discussed in latter part of this piece, women are
promised that the happiness of their families, which is dependent on their adequate servitude,
will in turn make them happy. This is partially true on the surface in that an unhappy and
unsatisfied husband may become a violent and punishing husband. This subliminally instructs
women to keep their husbands happy in order to avoid a beating and to preserve the housing and
income they receive from their husband. The tangible and social securities granted in exchange
for sacrificial happiness is advertised as the key to women’s individual happiness but ignores
true substantial existential happiness.
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The Unhappy Housewife: Happiness and Freedom
Ahmed, Friedan, and Firestone discuss domestic servitude as the root of female
unhappiness and to some degree, they are correct, but only on a superficial level. When women
are forced to stay at home and are forbidden from going outside, yes, a deep unhappiness can
arise from feelings of imprisonment. Alternately, Stockholm syndrome effects can lead women
to find pleasure in their domestic condition and fulfill a sort of pseudo-masochistic dynamic.
Feminists such as Friedan and Ahmed will argue that this is a false happiness, that no woman can
be happy so long as she is not free. Some hold that a woman must realize that she is a caged bird
singing but others like Firestone will argue that unhappiness will persist until women have true
freedom from the very root of their domesticity and dependency on male bread-winners;
uncontrolled fertility. Providing women choices and alternatives to restrictive structures is a
righteous cause but naming happiness and not freedom as the end result of such procedures is not
entirely accurate. Additionally, naming happiness as a byproduct of freedom is also not
completely correct either. Relief from pain and suffering may come from liberation but it is not
certain whether deep existential joy follows or if liberation and education even bring such
alleviations.
In The H-Spot The Feminist Pursuit of Happiness, Filipovic explains the disconnect
between what women were promised and how they were sorely disappointed. She writes, “The
shift among whites to the independent nuclear suburban family…relied on a promise that this
new model would make both women and men happy-and that, for women especially, the work
they put into the home would pay emotional dividends” (Filipovic 25). Women were promised
that they would find personal fulfillment through the gratitude her family would feel for her if
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she sacrificed everything for them. However, not only was this the dream of men who reap the
benefits of unpaid labor repainted as something women crave more than men but women became
disoriented and alienated when they in fact did not end up deriving happiness from this
submissive lifestyle.
As will be later discussed, Ahmed holds that increased freedom to see the horrible unjust
truths of the world, while worthwhile, may actually lead to more unhappiness once the veil of
blissful ignorance is lifted. However, I will fist discuss the interaction between pieces which
acknowledge the complex and ambiguous relationship between freedom and happiness. I will
demonstrate hidden and abstract forms of freedom and happiness often ignored by patriarchal
structures and many feminists by exploring Beauvoir’s analysis of how women find happiness in
the home, Chantal Akerman’s film, Jeanne Dielman, 23 Commerce Quay, 1080 Brussels, and
Marso’s “Freedom’s Poses.”
Akerman’s film is titled the name of the main character, Jeanne, and her address,
considering about ninety-nine percent of the film takes place behind the closed doors of her
apartment, where she reigns sovereign. Akerman’s depiction of the active yet obsessivecompulsive and potentially pathological homemaker reveals what Beauvoir discusses as the
home as the woman’s oasis from the harsh and chaotic male outside world and what Marso
discusses as spaces in which people are neither free nor entirely oppressed. As will be discussed
further on in this piece, uninhibited lasting individual happiness as a result of liberation may be a
construct defined by men who are able to think of themselves and themselves alone. What the
case of Jeanne displays is that housewives which many feminist authors would call patriarchy’s
prisoners are neither entirely unhappy nor happy. In fact, such radical feminist theories which
state that all housewives exist in a constant state of misery ignore the dynamic between complex
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and interwoven bursts of exuberant joy, violent anguish, and all of the emotions which exist on
the spectrum in between.
Feminist films, especially Akerman’s Jeanne Dielman, serve as valuable tools through
which viewers can perceive the subtle and mundane ways in which women exercise little pieces
of freedom and happiness through limited control within their constricted spaces. Women are
able to discover these forms of subculture and miniature sub-society within their homes and
domestic spaces, which do more than just mimic the outside world but rather open doors to new,
exciting, satisfying, and even joyous tasks. One may ask, have we taken too lightly the caged
bird’s song because we see the cage from the outside? Feminist film provides an unobtrusive
peak inside the cage so that we may find the little genuine joys and why the caged bird may sing
for herself, even when no one is around to listen.
In the case of Jeanne, she keeps herself painstakingly occupied for what feels like an
eternity to the viewer as she completes feminized activities, cooking, cleaning, and receiving sex
to fill her time in a cyclical nature. In other words, nothing is permanently completed and as one
task for her son or male Johns is completed, another needs to be done and the same exact tasks
need to be done multiple times a day, every day. Her inactive activity shows the women’s work
that happens behind the scenes in the imminent realm, in order for men to do things in the
transcendent realm. Akerman gives the audience the woman’s or child’s perspective in that it
shows boring, insignificant, and incredibly time-consuming invisible tasks whose processes are
never displayed in mainstream time and space but only in feminine time and space. Her neurotic
obsession with order, cleanliness, and perfection gives her a sense of personal accomplishment
and control but her inner world, the one which exists in her apartment, is threatened by the
chaotic world outside. Her almost superstitious routines which cleanse her feminine space of
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disruptive male energy maintain her sanity. Despite the fact that she operates in a male world, in
accordance with male time, either waiting for her son to return to school or for her clients to
arrive for their appointments, when her own time schedule is thrown off by a man and another
man disrupts her space, she lashes out and destroys a representative from the outer world to bring
balance to her little oasis.
Beauvoir discusses how woman are consistently in the position of passively waiting in
colonized time and space which they will never own. She describes the way in which women do
not have agency to change anything in reality, in the male dominated world so are left in the
realm of being imminent, or powerless in terms of making lasting impacts on their external
environment or humankind. Beauvoir writes, “Man’s truth is in the houses he builds, the forests
he clears, the patients he cures: not being able to accomplish herself in projects and aims, woman
attempts to grasp herself in the imminence of her person…It is because they are nothing that
many women fiercely limit their interests to their self alone, so that their self becomes
hypertrophied so as to be confounded with All” (667).
Her deliberate nature as well as the fact that she prefers solitude and is not actually the
pitiable lonely housewife that Friedan and Beauvoir discuss is revealed by her interaction with a
female friend. In fact, the viewer becomes increasingly aware of the fact that she finds deep
meditative serenity in completing her domestic tasks in solitude, uninterrupted by the outside
world. In “Freedom’s Poses,” Marso discusses how the dynamic between the home as a space
devoid of freedom and the outside world as representing true freedom ignores the complex
freedom found in domestic or imminent spaces and the concept that freedom and lack of freedom
can be found in unexpected ways. Marso writes, “I worry that to highlight walking as freedom’s
preferred pose hovers too close to the replication of the posture (and maybe the perspective too?)
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of the masculine self…what happens to other poses, postures, and activities when we single out
walking as…freedom’s path” (2). Akerman’s film and feminist films which focus on the

hidden ways in which women participate in transcendence in unorthodox ways show that
there is a creative aspect to making and molding objects in a space traditionally viewed as
restrictive, without having to transcend time and space in the typically male construction of the
idea.
The housewives Simone de Beauvoir ([1949] 2011) describes in The Second Sex are
confined in tight domestic spaces (sometimes, though, they are too expansive—think of
suburban kitchens), their bodies contorted into postures and poses that do not look at all
like freedom on the face of it. And yet Beauvoir notices that housework makes women
“grapple with matter” (Beauvoir ([1949] 2011, 472) and that housework can even be a
sensual experience: “In her fingertips she feels the freedom and power that the brilliant
image from the scrubbed cast iron reflects back to her,” (Beauvoir [1949] 2011). (Marso

3).
We see Jeanne’s satisfaction as she completes a task and gains satisfaction and pride in having
done so. She is a master of the home arts and does not appear to want assistance or company.
Flitterman-Lewis discusses how Akerman’s positioning of the camera “allows viewers to occupy
a position so close to a film’s characters that it replicates the process of subjective
identification…this involves what is known as the ‘point of view’ system” (31). Because her
camera is a “static, distanced camera,” the experience of the viewer is simultaneously formal and
impersonal because of the distance but also because you get this inside looks at private actions
that are usually not portrayed in modern Hollywood films because the majority of such works are
directed through the male gaze and therefore do not place emphasis on domestic tasks seen as
insignificant.
It is clear that Akerman’s camera has a quiet yet recognizable presence in that there is
nothing sneaky or forbidden about it. Instead of following the exploitative patriarchal perspective
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of peaking at women dressing or bathing to bring the voyeur pleasure, Akerman displays the
mundane tasks that have been hidden not because they are forbidden but because they’re usually
considered not worth watching. Flitterman-Lewis quotes Akerman saying, “The camera was not
voyeuristic in the commercial way because you always knew where I was. You know, it wasn’t
shot through the keyhole” (32). The viewer has the perspective of an ally and given the
opportunity to empathize with Jeanne, to analyze her actions as a means of understanding her
motivations.
In the film, Jeanne periodically babysits an acquaintance’s infant as a favor and had
always been able to do her other tasks such as preparing dinner while the baby was at her
apartment because the baby was cooperative and well behaved. Upon the mother’s return to pick
up her child, she confides in Jeanne in a desperate rant about the struggles of being a busy
mother and this woman’s imposter syndrome and general uncertainty. She tells Jeanne she does
not know what to cook for her husband and kids and talks about watching other women to see
what to order at the butcher and mimics their meat orders and actions because she is so unsure of
herself. While this could have been a perfect opportunity for unity and sisterhood or for the much
more confident Jeanne to give this new and frazzled mother soothing advice and consolation, she
just nods, offers nothing to the conversation, and eagerly closes the door so as to get back to her
routine. The viewer is given the impression that Jeanne, a domestic expert, cannot empathize
with this woman or that this woman shows weakness and chaos which makes Jeanne nervous by
association.
The audience can first see Jeanne’s obsessive tendencies after her first prostitution client
leaves after their session. Jeanne sits in the bathtub and painstakingly scrubs every single inch of
her body, seemingly ridding herself of the touch of the men she serviced so as to regain
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autonomy of her own being and be both physically and psychically thoroughly cleansed of the
men who could have lasting effects on her, therefore risking disrupting her routine, if their trace
remains on her skin. I saw a parallel between the way she was compulsively scrubbing her body
and the way Lady MacBeth ferociously washes her hands to regain control and purity and rid
herself of the guilt associated with the blood on her hands. Even though Lady MacBeth’s hands
were physically clean, the scrubbing seemed to be an attempt to ease her mind. The same could
be said with Jeanne’s need to clean behind her ears, in addition to everything else, when the odds
of her client dirtying her ears are slim.
After cleaning her person, the stationary camera shows Jeanne then bending over and
painstakingly scrubbing down the bathtub after she uses it to reclaim her home as her domain. It
first appear as though she was cleaning so as to please a man, whether that be her son or the
remnants of what her late husband expected. But it soon becomes apparent that these domestic
tasks are not burdensome tasks given by patriarchal pressures and in fact bring her ease.
Beauvoir writes, “Daily cooking teaches her patience and passivity; it is alchemy; one must obey
fire, water…To obtain a certain result, she will follow certain time-tested rites. It is easy to
understand why she is ruled by routine; time has no dimension of novelty for her…because she is
doomed to repetition, she does not see in the future anything but a duplication of the past” (639640). Here, Beauvoir describes how women are unable to control time or have a lasting effect
and she is not allowed to change her future so as a result, she finds comfort in repetition because
it is all she will ever know so long as a glass ceiling exists. Beauvoir grapples with the ambiguity
of happiness and freedom in constricted areas in that she recognizes that women can be both
powerless to and powerful over the objects in their home and that theory solely looking at
domestic life as oppressive misses the gray area. Marso writes,
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Beauvoir…is willing to see something unexpected: housewives learn practices of freedom
in the tightest and most unlikely spaces. They conform their bodies to spaces in ways that
limit free movement but teach important lessons about practicing freedom…subject to
disabling…repetitive and often boring processes, Beauvoir’s housewives squeeze freedom
out of these postures and processes, sometimes successfully transforming them into
creative and artistic encounters where they (and we) learn about compromised conditions
of agency… Inside, staying put, moving in cramped spaces, Beauvoir does not only see
lack of freedom. Instead, she sees how activities, locations, and perspectives that are
determined by relationships of oppression might teach women a new form of freedom, one
that eschews transcendence, overcoming, moving out and away from the home…This is…a
freedom that does not align with transcendence, with will, or with overcoming (3).
Marso analyzes the way in which women’s lessons about freedom are very dissimilar from the
way in which men and therefore mainstream theories of freedom are taught. Due to expectations
that women stay in the home and look after food for others, children, and a home which does not
even entirely belong to themselves, their theory of freedom is not as individualistic as it is for
men. Because women are responsible for boring tasks with require patience and submission,
women find alternate ways of being free, given their circumstances. Marso acknowledges how
Beauvoir reveals the complex dynamics in which everyone can be free and unfree, transcendent
and imminent. To view women inside the home as solely imminent ignores all that they create
and to view those outside of the home as transcendent ignores that which limits and dominates
them. Feminists similar to Freidan focus on will as the determining factor in levels of freedom
and therefore opportunities to choose to do whatever makes them happy. It is not so much that
Beauvoir disagrees with points made by Freidan but rather than Beauvoir recognizes more
expansive conceptualizations of freedom and happiness and that looking at freedom and the right
to happiness solely from a male perspective discredits varied emotions which occur in a
multitude of spaces. We see how Jeanne is happy with her world and has little to no desire to
escape the confines of her apartment by the way in which she quickly retreats to it following
necessary excursions for errands.
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Later, I discuss Shulamith Firestone’s claims about the false state of nature defined by
men in pursuit of individualistic freedom and personal happiness, regardless of the harms such
pursuits may bring the less fortunate. Marso discusses Beauvoir’s take on this concept in relation
to transcendence and imminence. Marso writes,
Transcendence is a false form of freedom made possible for certain men only because
their power allows them to force the non-white, the non-powerful, the non-male to do the
repetitive and back breaking tasks that reproduce the conditions necessary for living. But
here is a key insight of Beauvoir’s: it is only in situations of encounters with others, with
objects, with situations where we experience a lack of transcendence that we can learn
about how freedom actually works (4).
Most men hold that being free means being able to act alone, to do whatever one’s heart desires,
and impact the world in exciting ways easily, because the boring tasks needed for the
maintenance and sustenance of daily life are taken care of by the imminent. Beauvoir and Marso
hold that this does not constitute a complex nor realistic mastery and practice of freedom as a
concept. A feminine freedom, not necessarily a feminist freedom, is defined by navigation
around other immovable beings and objects, which teaches early and often about the limitations
one must experience if one is to justly interact with their earthly cohabitants. Fearful tiptoeing
around everything which has power over you gives lessons about toxic power. Furthermore,
healthfully acknowledging that absolute individual freedom is not worth potential happiness if
stepping over others is involved gives way to more mutually respectful constructions of society.
Only those who are first coerced into or expected to follow traditionally imminent
lifestyles, usually women, are then able to find happiness in powerlessness or in circumstances of
limited power; a lesson which is compatible with real life which involves not always getting
what one wants. Perhaps patriarchal constructions of the pursuit of happiness, the promise that
one can achieve absolute personal joy, set individuals up for disappointment. We see this
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gendered difference between Jeanne’s son, Sylvaine, and Jeanne. Sylvaine is unaware of the
labor his mother does while he is at school and becomes incredibly impatient and rude when he
suddenly comes home to only half of dinner completed. He is able to lash out because he feels as
though her job is easy, because he never witnesses the grueling actions which occur behind
closed doors. Because Jeanne is so busy remaking the potatoes she ruined so that Sylvaine could
have a perfect meal according to plan, she is not there to get his coat at hat at the door like she
always does. He notices because he is so used to seeing her with everything in order and tells
her, “Your hair’s a mess” and “You’re missing a button.” Despite her having labored intensively
to please him, she is expected to have hidden all of her hard work behind closed doors so that the
finished product looks like it was a pleasure to create, because after all, women are expected to
be naturals in the home arts. In contrast, when things do not go Jeanne’s way, she internalizes her
frustration and only in the very end, once the border between the transcendent world and her own
is torn down does she lash out in a masculine way, violently punishing he who upset her. Marso
writes,
Beauvoir says of cooking that, ‘working the dough [the housewife] experiences her power’
(472). She doesn’t mean this ironically-she is not simply marking false consciousness,
although she well knows that ‘working the dough’ is not truly power. What she means is
that women often get pleasure and even experience freedom and creativity in housework.
This is a kind of freedom that is much less dangerous than men’s misguided and adolescent
belief in their unmitigated sovereignty and power. Stooped toward others and stooped over
objects, learning the limits to transcendence, women experience a different kind of
freedom, and this is the kind of freedom we want to replicate in the world (4).
A feminine power respects the autonomy of other members in society and finds non-invasive
means of finding personal pleasure.
Maintaining domestic order with dignity is what gives Jeanne a sense of confidence and
even if she does not gain positive emotions from such actions, she might be doing them in order
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to ward off the bad emotions she knows would come if she allowed her person and environment
to lose order and be messy or not on schedule. She keeps a tight schedule for herself not only to
make sure that she has full control over everything but because with downtime, her idle body
leaves her with a busy mind, and with a busy mind comes existential panic and maybe the
realization of her dissatisfaction. Or perhaps, when she is not actively busy, the control over the
situation is not in her hands and she is rather, on the receiving end of chance, on whatever may
happen to her instead of what she is doing. The viewer may perceive Jeanne’s constant physical
activity to be oppressive but also evasive of the nagging thoughts which chase the mind. Her fear
of inactivity is what restricts her. Marso interprets Arendt’s argument in Responsibility and
Judgment and says, “Arendt worries explicitly about not stopping…She warns us
about…processes that move so well, so efficiently, so smoothly, that no one stops to question
where they are going, who they serve, what damage they might do and to whom” (5). We see
later in Akerman’s film the way in which Jeanne’s postponement of stopping to reassess the
breach of her oasis- and what this rush of sensation meant to her- culminates into a radical
release of emotions which had been repressed for the sake of productivity.
Jeanne’s deliberate yet obsessive manner is almost soothing to watch, as if it is
choreographed to maximize efficiency. Flitterman-Lewis describes the “obsession-tinged
serenity” that exists for Jeanne and the viewer who has entered her space (33). She folds her
son’s and her clothing with one sweep, crisply cleans every single inch of the house but does not
do more than needed, turns off the lights, closes the door/pot/window to each room before she
leaves said room in order to essentially check that task off the list even if she is going to enter the
room again in a little bit. To leave open ends so to speak might mean that that task could nag on
her mind and occupy it with anxiety and uncertainty. Marso discusses in “Perverse Protests:
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Simone de Beauvoir on Pleasure and Danger, Resistance, and Female Violence in Film” how
Jeanne’s domestic labor is not as much of a burden than some might originally assume it to be
and that her experience is far more complex. Marso writes, “…viewers come to see her tasks and
her relationship to them not only as mandated and determined by oppression…but also as
providing pleasure (they are ritualistic, aesthetic, bodily, and even sensual)… viewers do not get
the feeling that she wholly resents maintaining her home, or serving her son and servicing her
clients” (875). There is a simultaneously anxiety-producing and soothing experience of watching
Jeanne maintain her house. Akerman creates an experience of feminized time and space by
placing the camera in a position in which it does not interact or interfere with Jeanne’s daily
tasks. We are powerless help her but we are also comforted watching her do exactly what will
ensure that she is prepared with dinner for when her son comes home and with a clean and made
bed for when her clients arrive.
Flitterman-Lewis describes how the perspective of the camera is one “that is both shared
and intimate, one that is taken from daily life and childhood memory…the position of looking
evokes a generalized childhood view of a mother’s actions, reasserting the regularity of these
repetitive tasks” (33). What is unique about the child’s perspective is that the viewer gets an
unobtrusive, non-exploitative inside look into a woman’s world, one in which the viewer is
aware of the time it takes to do tasks, one as if you are watching your mother prepare for the man
of the house to come home for dinner.
Beauvoir discusses how women define their homes as their own safe spaces, over which
they have dominion and from which they can be protected from the threats of the outside world
that rejected them. Beauvoir writes, “…to find a home in oneself, one must first have realized
oneself in works or acts” (470). She discusses how in order to exist happily with the domestic
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world she has been relegated to, she almost has to trick herself into believing that the home is
real and the outside world isn’t, which is essentially the opposite of what patriarchal values hold.
Beauvoir writes, “She has to change this prison into a kingdom…by becoming prey, she liberates
herself by abdicating; by renouncing the world, she means to conquer a world” (471). Jeanne
appears to gain confidence, control, and power over the domestic realm both in her home and at
the butcher in that she is a master in the home arts and with certainty in this, she avoids the
existential derail involved in feeling like she is on the outside looking in or in the case of the
unhappy housewife, on the inside looking out. Beauvoir explains, “The home becomes the center
of the world and even its own one truth; as Bachelard appropriately notes, it is ‘a sort of counteror exclusionary universe’; refuge…womb, it protects against outside dangers; it is this confused
exteriority that becomes unreal” (471). In the case of Jeanne, what ultimately leads to her
deterioration is the violation of the border between the world she has control over and the world
over which she does not.
One of her most important compulsive tasks is her need to place a clean towel down on
top of her neatly made and fluffed bed for when she takes clients and then her need to remove
the towel and clean it after each use. Because it is so important to preserver her space, she feels
the need to control who enters her space, who messes it up, and who brings remnants of chaos
from outside into her orderly home. By placing the towel down, she is able to prevent the smells
and other messy effects of sex to remain in her space following the client’s departure back out
into the disorderly world. She repeats this step after each of her different clients that are
scheduled for a day a week, every week. The certainty of this crucial step however sets her up to
later feel desperately under attack when this action as well as the others is foiled by unavoidable
chaotic mishaps, causing her to lash out. Beauvoir writes, “Although she might close the doors
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and cover the windows, the woman does not find absolute security in her home; this masculine
universe that she respects from afar without daring to venture into it involves her; and because
she is not able to grasp it…she feels…surrounded with dangerous mysteries” (645). Jeanne’s
obsessive cleaning after her male clients leave demonstrates a need to cleanse her space of all
remnants of the male world. The threats of this unknown space make her uneasy and as long as
she is able to benefit from it in a way the male world allows, through the use of her body for
sexual satisfaction, she would like to have as much control over every other aspect of what she
comes in contact with since she will never be able to impact the world outside her apartment.
In the first stage of the film, Jeanne has complete control over timing but following a
mishap where she has an accidental orgasm with one of her clients, her timing becomes skewed
and she is left waiting inactively which drives her mad. The orgasm was destabilizing because it
forced her out of the bubble of numbness and controlled emotions through her tedious and
repetitive tasks. Jeanne did not get to choose when or how she was going to have the orgasm.
The rage she felt towards the last man and her murder of him is more understandable if the
viewer looks at the way in which her entire stabilizing routine began to fall apart after the first
orgasm with the second client. Marso writes,
the orgasm, which sets Jeanne on the path to murder. It is as if she were so used to
unfeeling, to the deadening and deadened effects of her small and straightened life, or to
the small bit of control that she had over her tasks, that this deadness and illusion of control
kept danger away… Thus, pleasure portends danger.
Unbridled joy and euphoria is not an emotion we witness on her face frequently. One could
argue that Jeanne is more a slave to her fear of disorder than she is to her optimism about order.
Instead of feeling a baseline contentment in states of chaos and happiness in response to order,
Jeanne feels contentment in perfect order and discontentment in anything less.
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Entirely used to her identical, repetitive, and cyclical routine, the viewer can easily spot
the mistake Jeanne makes with every single task following this surprise orgasm. Her key
moments of miserable inactive waiting are outside the shoe repair shop with her son’s loafers
because she arrives too early, in her kitchen as she anxiously stares at the wall while waiting for
the second pot of coffee to boil after spoiling the first, and waiting impatiently for her final client
of the day. This inactivity is a reminder of her imminence and disruptions from the world over
which she has no control threaten the oasis she has constructed for herself. The times when she
does have control in the outside world-at the butcher, shoe repair shop, and button shop- it is
apparent that she does not extend these journeys outside for longer than absolutely necessary.
Additionally, these are micro-oases in that they contain provisions for her domestic life,
objects to be used at home in her dominion and not in the patriarchal world. These objects do not
make a lasting influence on mankind and society but rather facilitate the maintenance of
impermanent components of life; meals which will give men energy to contribute to history and
shoes so that men can move upward and onward with ease. Jeanne is usually able to master these
outer spaces and balance them with her own but the barrier between these two worlds has been
broken following the destabilizing orgasm. What ultimately leads to her deterioration is the
violation of this very border between the world she has control over and the world over which
she does not. We see this as the baby she watches cries inconsolably so she cannot work, she
can’t find a button the right size to replace her missing one at any store, someone has taken her
routine seat at the café and her favorite waitress is out for the day.
Previously, each time a client arrived, Jeanne would take him to another room and the
stationary zoomed out camera would see the door closed. This time, once her final client arrives,
the camera gets an up close shot of her face while her client is on top of her. She looks visibly
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disheveled and upset and appears to be desperately miserable that an orgasm, something that
never happens, is happening to her and that she has no control over it. Finally, once he finishes
and she attempts to get dressed crisply and reclaim control, she sees in the mirror that her client
has pulled the towel out from underneath him and now his bare body is laying on her bed.
Horrified, frustrated, and desperate, she calmly walks over and efficiently murders him in one
swift stab to the neck with sewing scissors, a possible representation of either her domestic
servitude perceived by some or more accurately, a weapon native to her universe. Marso writes,
“Reading the film with Beauvoir, we can see that Jeanne is trapped somewhere in the murky inbetween of thwarted agency and too obvious, easily condemned, cliche´d violence as she
murders her john with a pair of scissors, the second-most-quintessential feminine weapon after
knitting needles” (881). Yes, she did murder this man out of her own volition but Akerman’s
decision to arm her with sewing scissors serves as a reminder of her limited circumstances.
During the murder, Jeanne entirely let go of all of the obsessive control she used to have but
following the murder, she simply acknowledging what she had done and she almost appears
relieved in a sense. Jeanne’s transformative process was marked by intense anxiety but she
reclaimed a sense of control by choosing to go with the flow instead of frantically preparing
dinner for her son nor clean up the bloody mess she made.
This final scene leaves the viewer with a number of choices to make in terms of their
interpretation of the murder. Some feminists like Freidan and possibly Ahmed might argue that
Jeanne’s murder of the John could be viewed as the final culmination of built-up resentment
towards those who forced her into domestic servitude. This stance is not entirely grounded in the
evidence found in the film given the fact that Jeanne clearly appeared to genuinely enjoy having
the opportunity to participate in sex work from home so that she could remain in her sacred
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space. She also finds pleasure in perfecting her craft and preserving her home, her palace,
through the labor of love she puts into that which makes her happy. Alternately, if unable to
justify her attack on another with an explanation on the original patriarchal attack on her, we are
left with the equally radical alternative perspective; she is insane and murdered out of selfish
impulse. Theorists such as Beauvoir and Marso acknowledge that her actions rather fit into a
category separate from these two options; one far more ambiguously acknowledging of the
complex woman’s condition as neither solely a victim nor assailant. Additionally, I will argue
that although Ahmed’s theory of the feminist killjoy in its traditional construction-which does
not acknowledge ambiguity as adeptly as Beauvoir or Marso- may not have originally be written
to include cases such as that of Jeanne’s, Jeanne could actually clearly be classified as a killjoy.
While not overtly political, Jeanne Dielman kills the joy of the viewers who are forced to watch
her obsessive behaviors and also quite literally kills a man.

The Unhappy as the Objects of a Modern Witch Hunt
In order to understand the need for Freudian psychotherapy to preserve patriarchal
dominance both privately and publicly, one must analyze the concept of the feminist killjoy and
how her unhappiness, viewed as pathological, threatens the very foundation on which patriarchy
stands.
With the maintenance of the patriarchal concept that women are happy with what men are
happy with comes the blame of women when they express the desire to pull out of what men
perceived as a mutual agreement. Ahmed writes, “We cannot always close the gap between how
we feel and how we think we should feel. To feel the gap might be to feel a sense of
disappointment. Such disappointment can also involve an anxious narrative of self-doubt (Why
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am I not made happy by this? What is wrong with me?) or a narrative or rage, where the object
that is supposed to make us happy is attributed as the cause of disappointment” (581). In both
cases, women are expected to believe that it is these internal faults which have spoiled the joy
instead of appropriately directing the disappointment towards the system rigged against them to
begin with. Ahmed writes how “situations of conflict, violence, and power are read as about the
unhappiness of feminists rather than about what feminists are unhappy about” (583). By reading
feminists as unhappy, one can distract from systemic problems that need fixing and rather
insinuate that this unhappiness, an ugly, inappropriate and subversive emotional condition is
inherent to the feminist.
The claims by patriarchal society about the innate characteristics of feminists and women
in general provide the basis for the argument that neither feminists nor women are incapable of
ever being pleased so there is no point in trying. This very concept also provides the basis for
society to accept the Freudian theory of female pathology as the root of their unhappiness rather
than legitimate oppression. Women who challenge the dominant culture are discredited as
mentally unstable so that their concerns not only are then taken as internally constructed as
opposed to real reflections of external injustices but also so that they can be prevented from
gaining support from other dissatisfied women who must not take the risk of ostracization by
association. But why is an inability to be made happy by what society expects one to be happy
with so threatening? Why is it not simply regarded as a matter of preference and why does
something as personal as individual happiness become so political, a female issue so problematic
that an entire school of thought needed to be altered and deployed in order to solve it? What is
the root of this anxiety? Is it fear that one will never actually find happiness since they were
unable to find it in what they thought they could or is it the fear of being seen as no fun, a killjoy.
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Ahmed writes, “The feminist is an affect alien, estranged by happiness…The feminist
killjoy spoils the happiness of other; she is a spoilsport because she refuses to convene, to
assemble, or to meet up over happiness…feminists are thus attributed as the origin of bad
feeling, as the ones who ruin the atmosphere, which is how the atmosphere might be imagined
(retrospectively) as shared” (581-582). This is exactly where feminism and its critique of gender
inequality is viewed as a call to abolish that which does not benefit those complaining but does
benefit those maintaining such conditions. While solving inequality only helps the marginalized
and does not necessarily injure the privileged but rather redistributes resources, the privileged
feel attacked by the concept that what makes them happy is not universally applicable.
The unchallenged narcissism of man feeds the perception of woman as their less-than
mirrors. Women are seen as less deserving of higher standards and they confirmed this for years
by settling for less. The result is shock when women purport that what men want for women and
even for themselves may not even be what makes women happy. This disorientating realization
is thus rejected and the killer of joy is punished or outcast. But how is happiness shared? Ahmed
writes, “Feminists…disturb the very fantasy that happiness can be found in certain places. To kill
a fantasy can still kill a feeling. It is not just that feminists might not be happily affected by the
objects that are supposed to cause happiness but that the failure to be happy is read as sabotaging
the happiness of others” (582). The issue at hand is that feminists do not simply state their
unhappiness as independent from the happiness of others. The feminist unhappiness is
accompanied by a demand that the happy reconsider the entire system and perhaps redistribute
that which gives them joy when selfishly owned. Jeanne is a perfect example of refusing to find
happiness in places which are expected of her.
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Jeanne satisfies neither patriarchal figures nor feminists and does something new and
consequently political; she does what she wants. Marso writes, “Akerman’s formal choices and
narrative frame refuse a simple reading of her heroine’s life that would show housework only as
drudgery and the female protagonist as patriarchy’s victim” (875). Jeanne disrupts the feminist
fantasy that happiness will be found in the outside world of action; the realm of transcendence,
beyond domestic oppression and pointless, grueling, and cyclical tasks. The commitment she
makes to cooking and cleaning- although the nature of the fruits of her labor are meant to be
destroyed and redone-demonstrates the fact that this routine and the protection she gains from
being in her home bring her peace. Many feminists are left with the impression that Jeanne’s
behavior is pathological due to the fact that they are unable to understand why she would be
genuinely content with and thrive in conditions of oppression. The feminist’s joy is in turn killed
by Jeanne’s alternative conception of joy.
In contrast, more traditionalist viewers who believe in the domestic relegation of women
may also find immense dissatisfaction in viewing Jeanne in that her happiness surrounding her
labor is for her own mastery rather than out of the vicarious joy a housewife is expected to feel
through preparation of meals and clean spaces for the loved males in their lives. Jeanne does not
grin with pride as her son eats and rather appears to resent him for consuming and destroying her
productions. While feminists may view her final murder of the John as satisfying and proof of
Jeanne’s little bit of rationale in that it serves their concept of justice, patriarchal viewers may
perceive everything but the murder as sane. In this case, the murder is viewed as proof of her
unhinging and rejection of normative femininity; one which nurtures and protects men.
While it may be counterintuitive to diagnose Jeanne’s rather violent behavior, attempting
to put a name to it offers the possibility to explore her motivations and affect. Her murder of the
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John could be proof of what Berlant calls “cruel optimism.” Jeanne’s obsessive lifestyle could
be viewed as unsustainable, one which set her up for immense dissatisfaction following a
disruption to the fragile balance in her mind reflected by the perfect order in her home. Jeanne is
optimistic that she will be able to keep everything in her home perfectly kept, despite the
invasion of men from the outside world. While she is able to preserve the other parts of her
home, the place where she services her Johns, the bed, becomes the location at which she angrily
retaliates once the order is lost. Berlant writes, “When we talk about an object of desire, we are
really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make
possible for us…Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic
object in advance of its loss” (20-21). Jeanne is attached to a problematic object; perfection in
her environment. She is optimistic that she can uphold this but this optimistic is cruel because it
is bound to fall apart. Berlant writes,

What is cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that
the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object
or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because
whatever the content of the attachment, the continuity of the form of it provides
something of the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living
on and to look forward to being in the world (21).
Jeanne clearly does not endure the loss of the cleanliness and sense of control over her
environment once the John removes the towel and places his filthy bare body on her bed.
Her obsession with order threatens her well-being in that it places her at great risk of
destruction in the event of its disruption. However, she cannot function without this order
and it may be centrally linked to Beauvoir’s points about her entire world existing within
her home and that by exerting control over the objects in her home, she thrives.
While Jeanne may find a sense of calm in these tasks, her experience with them is more
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than just that of a victim or a liberated woman who has reclaimed the joys of domesticity.
Akerman shows that feminine domesticity is not simply passive and that there are bubbling
desires and complex needs of women as subjects and this can enable the reader to see Jeanne’s
murder of her client in the end as more than just a psychotic break. Marso writes in “Perverse
Protests”, “Creating order in her day, and subsequently in her life, by tending to these jobs may
keep more dangerous emotions and disorderly thoughts and feelings in check” (875). These
dangerous emotions are not simply based on vengeance which an oppressed and abused
housewife may seek but are based on both rational and irrational desires which challenge the
idea that women are solely objects or the other and rather can be the subject, object, and as
Beauvoir details, everything in between. Marso writes, “With Beauvoir, we can see how
women’s seemingly pathological feelings and acts of violence, produced in isolation and
conditions of oppression, might be read as signs of resistance. They also signal the need for
feminist collectivity and solidarity…” It is too simple to view Jeanne’s behavior as pathological.
Given her limited circumstances, it could be argued that the only way for her to exert power and
maintain sanity in such unnatural conditions was to act equally unnaturally. Marso discusses the
“various ways individual isolated women exceed the limits of feminine identity and its mandated
behaviors to resist oppression in perverted yet discernible ways.” By going beyond what is
expected of polite, docile, cooperative, and gentle housewives and acting out of characterresembling the violence acted out by men-the sudden break in character is viewed as psychotic.
When looked at it through the lens of Beauvoir and Marso however, the perverse action can be
seen as a premeditated protest reflecting a rational preservation of one’s needs. Furthermore,
Marso invites us to challenge our concepts of appropriate political protest. After all, isn’t the
whole purpose of protest to upset the status quo, disturb and upset the ruling class, and achieve
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freedom however is possible given your individual limitations to full agency. She writes,
Seeing the heroines as motivated by a complex range of feelings and as enacting perverse
forms of protest unsettles the equation of political action with sovereign agency and forces
us to rethink any too easy equation of female violence with insanity or excessive female
sexual desire… Beauvoir alerts us to the insight that even the tasks and situations that bind
women to conditions of unfreedom provide surprising openings for agency, if in perverted
form, to emerge.
Jeanne did follow her happiness. She did what she felt was necessary to protect that which
ensured her contentment, even though it had a price for others. However, had she had entirely
uninhibited control over her surroundings, she would not have been in a position of desire. What
is unique here is that unlike external factors which some women face such as an abusive husband
who forces his wife to cook and clean, these conditions were created by Jeanne herself given the
limited options she had as a woman.
Furthermore, the very act of viewing Akerman’s Jeanne is one riddled with discomfort.
As Ahmed describes, the feminist killjoy sabotages the happiness of others by being unhappy
with what they are expected to find pleasure from. Jeanne makes almost all viewers
uncomfortable because we are forced to look at that which is private, not meant to be seen, is
obsessive, and spoils are ability to enjoy the products of her painstaking labor. Watching Jeanne
strenuously prepare meals, tidy rooms, do laundry, bathe and sew ruins the joy of coming home
to a clean apartment, with a hot homemade meal made, a clean and beautiful mother and wife,
and freshly washed and tucked sheets. We are made to feel guilty for even wanting the end result
of this effort. Our joy is killed by the private being made public in an unusually long, detailed,
and unabridged cut of domestic labor most adults who are not housewives are blind to. Our joy is
killed when we are given the message that nobody deserves the public result given the labor
which makes it possible. In other words, everyone wants a happy wife but cannot have this
without a slave. Akerman’s piece presents the hypocrisy of happiness paradigms as well as the
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unfairly polarized expectations from the right and the left regarding what is guaranteed to bring
women joy.
Ahmed discusses how the political aspect of feminism or any justice oriented political
movement is that the happiness of a ruling class is built off of the backs of the unhappy working
class. What makes feminism, a political movement backed by feminized individuals, so central
to happiness is that patriarchy expects a pleasing disposition from women. Women are expected
to nurture not only their children but their male spouses, parents, and everyone in their
community. The sacrifice women are expected to make in terms of their own happiness and
wellbeing will be further explored in the latter sections. Ahmed presents the question, “Does she
[the killjoy] expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs of
joy…[she] exposes how happiness is sustained, by erasing the signs of not getting along” (582).
The refusal to act happy so that oppressors do not have to come face to face with their
hypocritical concepts of rights to happiness is revolutionary. Akerman does just this by bringing
to public light that which, through erasure, upholds the happiness of the ruling class. This very
concept of shared happiness, the myth of public agreement that certain objects make everyone
happy and are neither problematic nor oppressive in any way, is what is called into question by
many feminists. The unwillingness to participate in this façade and the refusal to pretend that one
is satisfied presents the statement; I’m not changing my mind, so what are you going to do to
create external circumstances that I can be happy with.

Bend or Break-Freudianism to the Rescue
An unwillingness to adjust is central to Freudianism’s opposition to feminism. Firestone
explains how Freudianism acted as a “reactionary” force in the 1940s used to combat growing
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“pseudo-liberation” amongst women which was facilitated by the absence of men who were
away at war. Firestone writes,
Emphasis had shifted from the original psychoanalytic theory to clinical
practice…Marcuse discusses…the contradiction between Freud’s ideas and the possibility
of any effective ‘therapy’ based on them…The term that best characterizes this NeoFreudian revisionism is ‘adjustment’…The underlying assumption is that one must accept
the reality in which one finds oneself…one must also ‘adjust’ to the specific racism or
sexism that limits one’s potential from the very beginning. One must abandon all attempts
at self-definition or determination. Thus, in Marcuse’s view, the process of therapy
becomes merely ‘a course in resignation’ (58-59).
The process adjusted away from self-defined happiness and also asked patients to reorient their
concepts of satisfaction and rather lower their standards to what their oppressors were willing to
do, if anything, essentially learning to be happier with less. The concept of psychological
adjustment is linked to the concept of the feminist killjoy, Ahmed writes, “To be oppressed
requires that you show signs of happiness, signs of being or having been adjusted” (582). It is an
expectation of the oppressed that they thank their oppressors for the little that they have and
make it clear, despite it being a lie told so many times it begins to feel true, that it is their
pleasure to be treated like a dog.
This double edged sword of happiness is exactly what keeps marginalized groups
subjugated for so long. If they act as though they are happy to avoid punishment, it is assumed
they are more than content with their position and if they reveal any unhappiness, they are
pushed even further down than was thought possible in order to be reminded of their place.
Ahmed cites Marilyn Frye’s The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, “It is often a
requirement upon oppressed people that we smile and be cheerful. If we comply, we signify our
docility and our acquiescence in our situation…anything but the sunniest countenance exposes us
to being perceived as mean, bitter, angry or dangerous” (2). That being said, compromise in both
directions is necessary for the unhappy victim in order to be accepted as a cooperative member
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of society. These unspoken societal expectations resemble Rousseau’s The Social Contract in
that if one is to be a part of a society and reap its benefits, they must remain silent about their
discontents and keep their criticisms to themselves. The alternative is banishment. This black and
white thinking leaves no room for external political adjustment and rejects opportunities for
complaints by the oppressed to be seriously considered. Charles W. Mills details this hypocrisy
in “The Racial Contract” in which he describes how the social contract in society only actually
includes the subjects who dominate others considered to be objects. Mills writes,
…in a ‘state of nature,’ it suggests that they then decide to establish civil society and
government... on the popular consent of individuals taken as equals. But the peculiar
contract to which I am referring…is not a contract between everybody (‘we the people’),
but between just the people who count, the people who really are people (‘we the white
people’) … apparent racist violations of the terms of the contract in fact uphold the terms
of the Racial Contract (3).
In this model, the subjects who consented to the standards to which those included in the society
must consent to are white people but these individuals could be any hegemonic group such as
men, or even more specifically, white men who defined and formed the original social contract
known in modern Western society. The issue of consent is at the forefront of the racial contract
in that it points out that white people are under the impression that the objects consented to the
contract as soon as they were included after the fact. Allowing women to vote on laws
predominantly not formed with the purpose of protecting and fostering female happiness is not
equivalent to including women as subjects equal to men in the social contract. Women and
people of color did not consent to the norms, laws, and standards which formed Western society
so to punish these populations for violating the social contract is hypocritical.
The unhappy woman is not allowed the systemic privileges that happy men are given yet
are punished more severely than men are when expressing discontent with the existing exclusive
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standards. Interestingly enough, when men who are considered subjects, disagree with the agreed
upon rules and regulations of a given society, they are civilly asked to leave. They are given the
choice to leave and exist as a subject in another patriarchal society which may serve their desires
more sufficiently. In contrast, no woman is considered a full subject in any patriarchal society so
a dissatisfied woman is branded as undeserving of any privileges and is ostracized simply for
challenging the status quo and insulting its founders. This lack of respect for what Mills calls
“the remaining subset of humans” is not only just and legal but upholds the very contract in that
“the moral and juridical rules normally regulating the behavior of whites in their dealings with
one another…do not apply at all in dealings with nonwhites” (11). Fundamental concepts of
equality, peace, respect, and free-choice which serve as the basis for concepts of human rights
then are not relevant to “bothered” groups even though hegemonic members of society may
argue that subgroups are treated as fairly as dominant groups are treated.
The risk of being exiled, branded as a witch, of being marked as the type of person who
wanted their cake and to eat it too is largely what has kept dissatisfied women from publicly
voicing their concerns in a society which shames the unhappy. To proclaim unhappiness in this
system would be to insult those who believe their system is perfect for all since it is perfect for
them. This very concept of how the unhappy individual is viewed as an outsider is analyzed by
Ahmed. She explains how the meaning of the word unhappy was gradually adjusted from
“‘causing misfortune’… to ‘miserable…or wretched in mind’…[which] comes from wretch,
referring to a stranger, exile, or banished person…and even a ‘vile…or despicable person’”
(573). This etymological history reveals the public shame associated with being unable to find
happiness in what most in society are able to. Additionally, the transition from unhappiness
being the result of unlucky or hapless external forces to it being defined as something which is
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the fault of “a poor hapless being” facilitated victimization and increased diagnosis of the
unhappy as pathological. Those who are unable to adjust to the status quo nor the oppressive
standards of happiness are described not only as incurable but as dangerous based on the
assumption that their discontent is contagious. Women’s private pursuit of happiness through
psychotherapy became patriarchal society’s solution to brewing collective melancholy and an
alternative to being socially ostracized unhappy women. Firestone cites Marcuse in Eros in
Civilization as accurately describing the
reactionary…shift, showing how the contradiction between Freud’s ideas and the
possibility of any ‘therapy’ based on them-psychoanalysis cannot effect individual
happiness in a society the structure of which can tolerate no more than severely controlled
individual happiness-finally caused the assimilation of the theory to suit the practice (58).
The search for individual happiness is seen as a right in American society. Instead of outwardly
admitting that rejection of women’s demands for external improvements is a rejection of
individual rights, this energy was redirected towards quickly finding a way for women to feel as
though they still had an outlet; an alternative avenue towards what the ruling class had. Marcuse
writes,
The most speculative and ‘metaphysical’ concepts not subject to clinical
verification…were minimized and discarded altogether…Freud’s…concepts…[including]
id and the ego, the function of the unconscious, and the scope and significance of
sexuality…were redefined in such a way that their explosive content was all but eliminated
(Firestone 58).
Anything which allowed for the patient to question one’s own place in society was removed
from clinical applications of Freudian theory to prevent women from coming to terms with their
deepest frustrations and therefore making decisions which would disrupt the existing social
order. Firestone cites Freud’s Studies in Hysteria to explicate the goals of therapy and
Freudianism’s perception of the destructive tolls feminism took on the psyche. His is quoted as
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saying at the beginning of a session “[A great deal will be gained if we succeed in therapy in]
transforming your hysterical misery into everyday unhappiness” (Freud as cited in Firestone 59).
There is explicit acknowledgement given by Freud that the oppressed and melancholy female
patient will not reach true happiness through therapy, this could only be achieved through the
destruction of external oppressive barriers. Additionally, a misguided and anti-hegemonic
woman’s misery was seen as more pathological than the unhappiness experienced in a more
traditional and yielding role. The everyday unhappiness experienced by the unhappy housewife
described by Friedan is considered manageable by Freudianism in that in this case, there is a
glass ceiling to her goals. She may want to be a little less unhappy within her marriage but must
still consider her own self-improvement within the context of her oppressive marriage.
Those instituting psychoanalysis knew that nothing political would drastically change and
if anything, a conservative anti-feminist push-back was on the precipices. Therefore, they had to
diagnose those, including feminists, who were deeply disappointed with their quality of life in
the current system as pathologically sad and attached to unrealistic hopes. In Freud’s essay
“Mourning and Melancholia,” he defines mourning as “the reaction to the loss of a loved person,
or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country,
liberty, an ideal, and so on” and describes it as non-pathological due to the fact that the
individual is entirely conscious of who or what he has lost (243, 245). However, in the case of
melancholia, which is considered pathological, the patient “knows whom he has lost but not what
he has lost in him” and is therefore not entirely experiencing a conscious loss (Freud 245). To
extend this to the concept of feminism as pathological in the eyes of Freudianism, the unhappy
feminist killjoy could be described as melancholy in that she is considered unrealistically and
irrationally sad. Instead of losing an object, she is viewed as losing sense of reality or forgetting
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her place considering Freud describes melancholia as “pointing to a loss in regard to his ego”
(247). The feminist’s search for self-defined happiness, freedom, and independence are seen as
misguided. The unhappiness Firestone described amongst aimless feminists following halts to
women’s rights progressions is best as melancholia, intrinsic to the unsatisfiable woman, by
Freud. Ahmed’s concept of the banishment of the unhappy woman, the wretch, can be closely
related to Freud’s melancholic patient:
In mourning, it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego
itself. The patient represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achievement and
morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and
punished (Freud 246).
In other words, the melancholic person is viewed as self-destructive and is considered ungrateful
for biting the hand that fed him. This diagnosis allows the oppressor a justification and rids those
responsible of any accountability. Because what women and feminists want is seen as
outrageous, the mourning of her rights and happiness is viewed instead as unreasonable by
patriarchal hegemony. Ahmed’s history of unhappiness describes the patriarchal etymological
evolution of the word in order to make sociopolitical commentary on those who are incapable of
achieving happiness and therefore, are beyond help. Freud’s description of the melancholic
patient frames these criticisms of the individual’s morals and innate faults as placed on oneself.
In this case, the poor unhappy individual is depicted as desperate to be included back into
society, to be fixed, adjusted, or cured by a psychoanalyst. The melancholic person described as
detached from society is blamed for making up these conceptions for themselves. The idea that
those who are melancholic and isolated due to oppression and exclusion is not allowed within
this categorization. Mourning on the other hand, is characterized by rational sadness in response
to that which is considered externally legitimate by patriarchal society. It is expected that the
marginalized in society mourn that which has been taken from them speedily and readily in order

38
to be considered healthy and nonthreatening. Grudges are key to remaining unhappily aware of
those who wronged you. Remembering, despite how painful it may be, is key to the feminist
fight.

The Right to Unhappiness
I have addressed how unhappiness is viewed as dangerous to repressive governments and
patriarchal structures but we must also ask; is unhappiness also an ideal which feminists and
women seek to escape and/or does unhappiness come with many of the goals of feminism;
clarity, revelation, and increased awareness? Education is frequently presented by feminist
scholars as a route to success, empowerment, and therefore a necessary right in order to be as
happy as men. However, are education and happiness linked? Rather, are education and the
unhappiness that comes with awareness linked? Firestone and Ahmed would say so. The right to
unhappiness is a concept which arose out of the pursuit of something more sustainable and
meaningful than mainstream happiness and basic contentment. While Ahmed argues that
unhappiness comes with pursuits of justice and knowledge, feminist thinkers such as Virginia
Woolf look more closely at truth and prioritize knowledge as a means of being able to best
describe the world in order to evoke all feelings including joy and sadness.
Ahmed discusses the way in which education or rather expansive imagination and
awareness through any means becomes not only a more sustainable alternative to happiness but
happiness becomes irrelevant once women are shown revolutionary frameworks in which being
happy is no longer the absolute best thing someone can amount to. She writes, “Imagination is
what makes women look beyond the script of happiness to a different fate…if we do not assume
that happiness is what is good, then we can read the link between female imagination and
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unhappiness differently” (585). A common notion for centuries was that education would make
women and any uneducated and oppressed mass population forget their place in the hierarchical
structure. Scare tactics framed women who got educations became riddled with misery because it
distracted them from that which could only bring women genuine joy; their husband, children,
and home. Many think that one can have the freedom of mind that comes from an expanded
awareness of one’s condition and happiness as an end goal but Ahmed challenges the concept
that happiness is the emotion which fills the soul in ways others cannot. She continues, “We
might want girls to read the books that enable them to be overwhelmed with grief. Feminism
involves political consciousness of what women are asked to give up for happiness. Indeed, in
even becoming conscious of happiness as loss, feminists have already refused to give up desire,
imagination, and curiosity for happiness” (585). Perhaps one is best able to feel alive, fulfilled,
most herself or on the right track towards living her truth when inconsolably miserable. The
depth that one is able to feel or explore in this state or even during the process from sadness to
happiness and back to sadness holds more meaning and potential than a desperate cling to
constant happiness does.
Woolf begins A Room of One’s Own by searching a library full of works by men on the
history of women in order to find the clarity about women’s experience. She argues that if
women had access to formal education comparable to that accessible by men, they would be able
to produce better, influential, androgynous work through which women’s relative poverty and
oppression would not be detectable. Woolf writes, “One must strain off what was personal and
accidental in all these impressions and so reach the pure fluid, the essential oil of truth.” Because
women have been unable to escape their oppression, their work has suffered and they have been
unable to produce what Woolf describes as pure and genius fiction. Instead of focusing on the
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individual happiness women could achieve by having delicious meals and fine lessons in
literature, she focuses instead on genius as the goal. For Woolf, genius means having the ability
to describe the world in a way which gives materiality to the indescribable. Instead of writing on
the misery that comes with learning more about women’s misfortune, she discusses education as
a route through which women could contribute to a history of women’s experiences so that the
complexity of female characters, the happy and unhappy, beautiful and hideous, can be shared
with readers. Since men have been the main contributors to works on women, Woolf is more
angered by the lack of truth resulting from this injustice than the injustice itself. Her
preoccupation with fiction, while predominantly apolitical, resembles Beauvoir’s argument that
women are unable to act in a transcendent nature by making lasting impacts on the world and the
history of humankind. Beautiful fiction outlasts its authors and women should be able to live
beyond a pitiful life of dependency. With education, women could then have the opportunity to
read and write about other women and move beyond their own impoverished position which
limits them to illiteracy and dependency and subsequent marriage and childrearing.
Turning to education is one approach to female aimlessness but education on male
defined doctrines may further frustrate women. Women’s internal pursuit of solutions to their
unhappiness and confusion were sought both through therapy as well as through their own
education on the matter. Firestone writes how, “Mass confusion sent them in droves to the
psychoanalysts” due to the fact that women… “were neither insulated and protected from the
larger world as before, nor were they equipped to deal with it” (62). Women were incredibly
disoriented following the temporary pseudo-liberation they experienced following the granting of
the vote but were then harshly cut off from ever again tasting something they could now never
forget. While women were certain that they had been deprived, they were uncertain about how to
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cope with this loss. Firestone writes, “Their frustration often took hysterical forms, complicated
by the fact that they were despised the world over for even the little false liberation they had
received” (62). Despite psychoanalysts’ such as Freud and Reik’s insistence that women’s
frustrations were subconscious, women were aware of the patronizing angle they were met with
in therapy yet remained with hopes that they would discover something useful given the fact that
this was one of the only options. “It is not that these women were unaware of their situation: on
the contrary, they were in Reik’s office because of this awareness. There was no other way to
handle their frustration because there is no way to handle it, short of revolution” (Firestone 61).
With increased clarity about of one’s devastatingly mired situation, comes emotional turmoil,
frustration, and desperate attempts to alleviate this pain. While it was not only women going to
therapy, almost all members of society who were in therapy, including men, flooded in because
of the fight against feminism and the attempt to reign women back into traditional family roles.
Curiosity about how to seek inner peace and closure was a large factor which drew
women into the study of psychology. The psychology studied by women was strictly clinical as it
occurred following the institution of adjusted neo-Freudianism. Firestone writes, “Masses of
searching women studied psychology with a passion in the hope of finding a solution to their
‘hang ups’” (62). An awareness of one’s “hang ups” reveals that they know they are unable to
move past their specific frustration, but that they consider it something that must be fixed, a
nuisance, something which compromises others’ happiness, because of how patriarchal society
views their grievances. Instead of analyzing their own lack of desire to sleep with their husbands,
which could be explained by the husband’s oppressive and threatening behavior, women’s
anxiety is instead read as a hang up, something they must get under control so as to function
normatively within existing systems. The goal is to effectively become happy with what they are
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told will make them happy. “Psychology departments became half-way houses to send women
scurrying back ‘adjusted’ to their traditional roles as wives and mothers…Often the only
difference between the modern college-educated housewife and her traditional prototype was the
jargon she used in describing her marital hell” (Firestone 63). In essence, this education in
clinical psychology simply provided the words to better describe the problem but no tools to
solve it. Even if women did not resign to what they were told in psychotherapy, their investment
in the field of psychology, in an attempt to find the key to happiness, gave further legitimacy to a
school of thought based on the opinions and perspectives of men.
By mastering psychology within its patriarchal confines and contributing to clinical
applications of oppressive phenomena, women supported the very institution which was
preventing them from reaching genuine, self-defined happiness. Firestone writes, “Those women
who persisted in demanding careers became in turn instruments of the repressive educational
system, their new-found psychological ‘insight’…serving to keep a fresh generation of women
and children down” (62). Women were encouraged to succeed academically and professionally
within this field and this served as yet another false liberation in that these women were not
allowed to bring their own personal insights to their work but were rather rewarded for mastery
of a repressive framework. In their attempt to seek objective truths about happiness for
themselves, much like Woolf attempted by reading established works on women’s condition
written by men in A Room of One’s Own, they supported pseudo-science. While women were
finally being included into higher academia, they were still being designated to social sciences
based on unchecked male theories while men were allowed to thrive in hard sciences. At the root
of STEM disciplines is the scientific method, which allows the studier the opportunity to entirely
reject hypotheses which stand on no logical ground. In contrast, clinical applications of social
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sciences do not make space for bogus hypotheses based on sexist biases to be nulled. Firestone
explains the purpose of this divide, “…social science became ‘functional’, studying the operation
of institutions only within the given value system, thus promoting acceptance of the status quo”
(63). Purely observational, there was little allowance for intervention and in the attempt to seek
clarity, women became more estranged from their true desires.
Similar to how women were told to not whine about anything else after being included in
legal frameworks of rights, women’s minor yet significant inclusion in academia was
accompanied by expectations of contentment. The issue with this however is that blissful
ignorance and education are contradictory. Happiness became even more difficult with the
increase of knowledge and consciousness about women’s’ own poor condition and the factors
which contributed to it. Ahmed writes, “If the world does not allow you to embrace the
possibilities that are opened up by education, then you become even more aware of the injustice
of such limitations…expanding one’s horizons can thus mean becoming more conscious of just
how much there is to be unhappy about” (584). Women’s education frequently led them to dead
ends since they were discriminated against in the workforce and pushed back into the home to be
a smart yet miserable housewife and mother. Furthermore, with awareness of injustice does not
come freedom. If anything, one feels more trapped by their circumstances. While this section
focuses on how women seek consciousness, Ahmed discusses how even communal
consciousness raising does not necessarily lead to happy sisterhood. She writes, “Consciousnessraising does not turn unhappy housewives into happy feminists” because there are so many
barriers in place which keep women from escaping and even if they were to physically escape,
they would not be able to rid themselves of the guilt society places on the wretch who shirks her
responsibilities as a woman (584). Moreover, women are pressured to be happy so that others do
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not have to worry about them disgracing the community. Consequently, women may internalize
this pursuit of happiness as their own goal and may even prioritize their own happiness over
fighting for what is just. Ahmed provides commentary on Lorde’s The Cancer Journals, saying,
“The freedom to be happy can be translated into a freedom to avoid proximity to whatever
compromises one’s happiness…that our first responsibility is to our own happiness is what
allows us to look away” (590). While therapy and education can be presented as liberating, both
opportunities for women to become their best selves and strive for happiness, they support the
patriarchal construction that unhappiness is pathological and damaging to both the individual and
the community.
Unhappiness comes with being awake in an unjust system. The goal of fighting for what
is right even if it entails exposure to tragedy is more expansive than the goal of personal
happiness. It is also more dangerous to governments who so generously grant civil rights in order
to propagate the ideal of individual happiness so as to encourage its citizens to turn blind eyes to
destruction. Ahmed’s proposition of the “freedom to be unhappy” reveals the repressive
pressures both patriarchal government and clinical psychotherapy place on marginalized people
to put on a happy face so the oppressors do not have to come to terms with the damage they have
caused.

The State of Nature and Its Promises for The Happy Few
I have discussed whether individual happiness is a worthwhile pursuit, why happiness
ideals exclude women and oppressed minorities, and whether freedom over happiness should be
a goal of our society. In order to understand theories of communal happiness and the happiness
that individuals achieve through others by means of companionship, romantic love, or parenting,
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we must first understand why Western civilization prioritizes individual happiness, even if it
means the violation of liberty and joy of the less privileged. Happiness is framed as an individual
emotion in that it is a male ideal grounded in major U.S. political theory. Thomas Hobbes, John
Locke, and Thomas Jefferson focused on theories of individual freedom in the state of nature as
opposed to more expansive concepts of relative freedom. Looking at the individualistic state of
nature theories which largely formed our governments and norm systems gives us insight into
why happiness is not looked at in a holistic or mutualistic manner. Feminist theorists such as
Firestone, Goldman, and Weiss provide insight into new frameworks of the state of nature from a
feminine perspective and therefore give alternative solutions to unhappiness and lack of freedom
in society.
Thomas Jefferson's "original Rough draught" of the declaration of Independence
includes, “We hold these truths to be sacred & undeniable; that all men are created equal &
independent, that from that equal creation they derive rights inherent & inalienable, among
which are the preservation of life, liberty, & the pursuit of happiness” (Jefferson 1760 cited in
Boyd 1950). While in concept, this political framework appears to promise egalitarian rights for
all, it really only does give these rights to white, land-owning, men. In exchange, it exploits the
concept that these rights are given by God to justify an omnipotent government which infringes
on the rights of those not included in such theories. In this construction of a state of nature,
everyone is vicious and miserable due to fear of violence committed by others. However, this
induces fear amongst the uneducated masses and then justifies the placement of a leviathan
which upholds the powerful at the expense of the impoverished. Feminist scholars such as
Firestone and Goldman hold that nature from a feminine perspective is more benign and these
theorists have more faith in humankind.
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In addition to Hobbes’ theory of the leviathan and the concept that everyone is selfish is
destructive, his bizarre idea that men are born as fully formed intellectually superior humans
erases the physical and emotional collaborative labor women and mothers put into raising boys
into men. He writes that " men …. emerged from the earth like mushrooms and grown up
without any obligation to each other…" Rather, as Firestone holds, men are raised to have no
obligation to one another because they do are not aware of all of the unhappiness that occurs
behind the scenes amongst women which makes their happiness possible. She argues that women
have a more heightened and expansive concept of communalism and an awareness of the need to
protect those who are vulnerable and dependent due to greater biological vulnerability.
This includes women who are weak from menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth,
breastfeeding, and menopause and therefore are dependent on aid and collaboration for survival.
Because of this, women are aware that they cannot simply think for themselves and fight for
their needs alone. This experience within the family contributes to their stances on politics and
contrasts greatly with those of Hobbes’. Shulamith firestone accredits the inequality in today’s
society to the biological differentiations between the sexes and argues that such separations in
reproductive functionality, in turn, create the first means of class hierarchy which inevitably turn
into inequality. She essentially holds that all pathology in society, whether it be pertaining to sex,
class, race, is rooted in the biological nuclear family that exists in a patriarchal society. Firestone
essentially argues that sexism predates racism and that the original industry is the biological
family.
While her theory does open up the possibility for manipulation of this biologically
defined weakness and differences between the sexes, I think it almost takes the social definitions
about female’s weaknesses based on biology and turns them on their heads by essentially arguing
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that this biological difference was exploited to begin with in order to create an unequal power
structure and that in order to change this perverse power structure, we have to go back to the
beginning and eliminate or reduce these the debilitating and impairing effects of such biological
differences through technology such as birth control (p. 9). By using biological definition,
Firestone is reclaiming the very weapons used against women in the sexist struggle for years.
Instead of shying away from biological definitions and rejecting them entirely because they were
exploited by men, Firestone bravely redefines these biological bases and tries her best to
articulate their limitations.
Firestone writes, “The need for power leading to the development of classes arises from
the psychosexual formation of each individual according to this basic [reproductive] imbalance,
rather than, as Freud…and others have…postulated, some irreducible conflict” (9). She breaks
down this biological imbalance into four “fundamental-if not immutable-facts” including the
first, “that women…before the advent of birth control were at the continual mercy of their
biology…which made them dependent on males…for physical survival” (9). She also includes
the fact that “human infants take an even longer time to grow up than animals, and thus are
helpless…and dependent on adults,” “that a basic mother/child interdependency has existed,”
and “that the natural reproductive difference between the sexes led directly to the first division of
labor at the origins of class” (9). Firestone cites Beauvoir in order to make her claim that unlike
in a Hobbesian state of nature, we are not mere slaves to the worst of our urges because of nature
but that modern human society should transcend biological inequalities. Firestone writes,
And the kingdom of nature does not reign absolute. As Simone de Beauvoir herself admits:
‘The theory of historical materialism has brought to light some important truths. Humanity
is not an animal species, it is a historical reality. Human society is an antiphysis-in a sense
it is against nature; it does not passively submit to the presence of nature but rather takes

48
over the control of nature on its own behalf.’…Thus the ‘natural’ is not necessarily a
‘human value’ (10).
She acknowledges that if society is to progress, community and equality must be the priority and
highlights the fact that concepts of pathology in Freudian psychotherapy are based on the
concept that social inequality was natural and that people’s frustrations were inner issues meant
to be “cured” (14).
Just as Firestone holds that the patriarchal nuclear family is a restrictive and isolating
force for women, Valerie Solanas introduces the idea, in her piece, “S.C.U.M Manifesto (Society
for Cutting Up Men),” the way in which women are prevented from uniting politically for the
greater good by men’s isolation of women from each other out of fear and jealousy of women’s
strength if unified. Similar to the way in which Firestone argues that the family unit is the root of
all pathology and oppression of women, Solanas presents her theory about why men contribute
to the privatization of women and how this gets in the way of societal progress. Solanas writes,
Our society is not a community, but merely a collection of isolated family units.
Desperately insecure, fearing his woman will leave him if she is exposed to other men or
anything resembling life, the male seeks to isolate her from other men and from what little
civilization there is, so he moves her out to the suburbs…Isolation enables him to try to
maintain his pretense of being an individual…equating no-cooperation and solitariness
with individuality (5).
Essentially, Solanas argues that this domination is simply an attempt to achieve women’s
coveted true individuality but men fail, only accomplish isolation, and keep women from their
potential, which is “vibing” with other powerful and inspiring women who want to achieve “a
true community consist[ing] of individuals” (6). Because of women’s isolation from one another,
consciousness raising becomes more difficult. Solanas explains how even in circumstances in
which the man appears to be liberal, egalitarian, and sympathetic to the woman’s need for
independence, so long as there is a greedy man in charge of a structure which has not been
separated from the marriage model, it is bound to be hierarchical and exploitative of women. She
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explains the instance of the “hippy,” a man who claims to be more ethically oriented than the
men in mainstream society. Solanas explains how even in an alternative communal patriarchal
setting, women are silenced so long as they are isolated. She writes, “In the name of sharing and
cooperation, he forms a commune or tribe, which, for all its togetherness and partly because of it,
(the commune, being an extended family, is an extended violation of the female’s rights, privacy
and sanity) is no more a community than normal ‘society’” (5). The family structure, regardless
of its multiple variations and alternative models, is a basic way to control girls and women and
make them feel responsible for their own suffering, which in turn, silences them and prevents
them from revealing private “family business” to strangers.
Emma Goldman, a democratic Socialist and anarchist holds that people’s baseline urges
without government are benevolent in contrast with Hobbes’ which is far more individualistic
and treacherous. Goldman demonstrates her faith in humans to naturally unite as opposed to
turning against one another, writing, “Only in freedom will he learn to think and move, and give
the very best in him. Only in freedom will he realize the true force of the social bonds which knit
men together, and which are the true foundation of a normal social life” (Goldman 72-73). Her
concept of normal is classified by that which is nondestructive, healthy, non-pathological, and
granting of happiness for everyone, created by the people. Goldman holds that without
government’s toxic oppression and corruption of man’s pure intentions, people will form their
own small groups to organize society in a way that benefits all. She recognizes the claim to
power by those who rule by a Hobbesian fear model and her anarchism is rooted in a belief that
people are able to protect one another. While Firestone is less suspicious of government in that
she wants the government to improve on the condition of women by helping the seize the means
of reproduction, Goldman believes that a supportive village model, which she witnesses among
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women, separate from government, is the key to mutual respect and happiness. Despite briefly
dabbling in communism, Goldman loves individuality not patriarchal individualism and holds
that people can only truly find their own happiness when loved and supported by a community.

Mutual Dependency Versus Sacrificial Love
Marso discusses in “A Feminist Search for Love: Emma Goldman on the Politics of
Love, Sexuality and the Feminine,” how despite Goldman’s rejection of “marriage and the
conventional nuclear family” like Firestone, “she neither rejects nor condemns romantic love;
she places intimate connections with others as central to her life and her politics” (306). Unlike
the patriarchal model of happiness through one-sided sexual consumption of women, Goldman
advocates for “sexual freedom and revolutionary love [which] offer a radical critique of
intimacy” (306). Goldman looks at the relationship between women’s political stances and
personal desires which are often subconscious reflections of men’s desires simply internalized
and reclaimed by women.
While Goldman firmly opposes marriage as an intrusive political construct, she holds a
belief shared by Firestone as well as many others; that you cannot truly be happy or free if you
go home and sleep with the enemy at the end of the day. Marso writes, “Her life experience had
made it clear that no true freedom for women could exist without a fundamental revolution at the
intimate level between human beings in their relationships of love and sexuality” (307). She
holds that anarchism can only succeed if people liberate themselves from companionship but that
women are also are entitled to choose what satisfies them, so long as it does not oppress them.
Marso cites Goldman as saying, “Anarchism stands for a social order based on the free grouping
of individuals for the purpose of producing real social wealth; an order that will guarantee every
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human being free access to…full enjoyment of the necessities of life, according to individual
desires, tastes, and inclinations” (1969:62) (Marso 307). Theorists such as Andrea Long Chu
have consistently presented the important argument that people must investigate their sexual and
romantic desires to see if they are politically destructive and exclusive but should ultimately be
free to love or make love with whoever makes them happy. Chu writes “…nothing good comes
of forcing desire to conform to political principle…This does not mean that politics has no part
to play in desire” (10). She argues that judging individuals on their politics based on their
personal bedroom behaviors runs the risk of breeding authoritarianism but that people should
still voluntarily investigate the insidious ways in which hierarchical power dynamics have
influenced people’s personal preferences. Similarly, Srinivasan argues that you cannot police
people’s desires, nor can they control their own, but you can make people aware of problematic
patterns of behavior that are both influenced by the patriarchy and are potentially discriminatory.
Srinivasan explains how modern feminism, including Willis’ works, and its emphasis on sexpositivity and protecting people’s personal preferences and desires, so long as mutual consent is
agreed to, overlooks political feminist intersectionality by removing such actions entirely from
the public, political realm, which is somewhat impossible. She writes, “the sex-positive gaze,
unmoored from Willis’s call to ambivalence, threatens to neutralize these facts, treating them as
pre-political givens. In other words, the sex-positive gaze risks covering not only for misogyny,
but for racism, ableism, transphobia, and every other oppressive system that makes its way into
the bedroom through the seemingly innocuous mechanism of ‘personal preference’” (6).
As we saw in the case of Jeanne, love for one’s children and husband are complex in that
many do find pockets of happiness even if the majority of their happiness was being sacrificed
for their loved ones. Marso writes how Du Bois and Gordon “note the contradictions women
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lived; ‘what was conceived as women’s greatest virtue, their passionate and self-sacrificing
commitment to their children, their capacity for love itself, was a leading factor in their
victimization’ (1983: 12)” (308). It is interesting however to look at the ways in which love, even
genuine love which fills the heart and soul with boundless happiness, is criticized as being at
odds with freedom. The question once again is; must a woman give up on the mutual possession
associated with a loving relationship in order to find a deeper happiness which comes from
within her or is there a compromise between the two which reflects feminine awareness of and
respect for dependency and the harmless and often unconditional love which comes with it.
According to Goldman, “her development, her freedom, her independence, must come from her
and through herself” (Goldman cited in Marso 310). In this context, Goldman is arguing that free
sex, free love, free and varied companionship are the only means through which women can
fulfil their fantasies and desires. This framework however does not take into consideration
reciprocal accountability to another and freedom within healthy monogamous romantic
relationships. Marso inquires, “…The choice of true freedom involves difficult sacrifices…Can
‘sexual varietism’ satisfy a person’s emotional desires, one’s need to have an intimate confidante
…? Does one have to completely give up on emotional commitment and/or mutual dependency
in order to be truly free?” (310). In other words, does one have to sacrifice happiness for freedom
if happiness is achieved through a committed mutually dependent loving relationship which the
woman enters out of her own volition? Goldman does acknowledge that true, equally expressed
and felt love, separate from the exploitative forces of marriage, is actually a central part of living
life fully and the happiest one can be. Marso writes, “…it is clear that Goldman was trying to
reconcile sexual and individual freedom with the demands of love and reciprocity” (312). The
feminist claim that pure masculine independence without emotional accountability to another is
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enough for women to be satisfied and fulfilled overlooks the strength in vulnerable mutual
dependency, and solely focuses on the weakness of it perceived by a patriarchal audience.
Goldman consistently expressed her discontent with romantic loneliness in pursuit of a
concept of freedom which would not quite fit her soul, no matter how adamantly she tried. Marso
writes, “Telling Berkman that she [Goldman] longs to express ‘love and affection for some
human being of [her] own’, Goldman suggests a break with the philosophy of anarchist feminists
who argue that sexual freedom necessarily implies a rejection of emotional possession” (314).
Intimacy, which can bring immense fulfillment and gives many peace, happiness, and an
alleviation from solitary unhappiness, can actually bolster one’s ability to feel free so long as
there is open communication within said relationship. While heterosexual monogamy frequently
internalizes toxic lessons from patriarchy, such as jealousy and oppressive possession,
Goldman’s revolutionary stance gives women the individual choice to reform their relationships
instead of solely suggesting polyamorous love as the only egalitarian solution, which is easier
said politically than practiced personally.
Focusing on jealousy, Marso discusses how feminist theorist Cleyre claimed that “To be
jealous of possessive was to make a claim to private property” but that Goldman recognized the
individuality that is the happiness experience and that jealousy as a natural emotion should not
be punished but investigated with patience (314). Marso explains how Goldman “…tempers her
condemnation [of jealousy] by acknowledging that the ‘two worlds’ of ‘two human beings, of
different temperament, feelings, and emotions’, must meet in ‘freedom and equality’ if they are
to conquer the ‘green-eyed monster’ (Goldman, 1998: 221, 216 cited in Marso 314). Jealousy,
while clearly upheld by the patriarchal nuclear family unit norm, is characterized by an inability
to be happy for another if they’re happiness takes away from yours. Jealous girlfriends and
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snooping wives in Western civilization and culture are built up to be a monstrous pathological
digression away from the ideal model of the selfless woman, wife, and mother, praised for her
ability to nurture and create joy for others and not kill it, even if it kills her in the process. Is
sacrificial happiness even a worthwhile, let alone realistic or feasible construct or is it based on
folklore?

A Case Study in Dependency and Unnecessary Sacrifice
We can look to the movie, The Hours, and its portrayal of Virginia Woolf and female
characters who represent the characters she wrote in her novel, Mrs. Dalloway, for insight on the
ways in which expectations of sacrificial happiness as a normative component of true love
impact women similarly across different circumstance and generations. In The Hours, the three
women, Clarissa Vaughn (2001), Laura Brown (1950s), and Virginia Woolf’s (1920s) lives are
interconnected by Woolf’s novel Mrs. Dalloway. We follow Woolf’s process as she writes the
film to reflect her revelations about sacrificial love and dependency and both Laura and Clarissa
find inspiration from the book written by Woolf. The parallels between the three women are as
follows: Leonard fears Virginia will kill herself if she is not made to be happy, Clarissa fears
Richard will kill himself for the same reason, and young Richard (Richie) fears that Laura, his
mother, will kill herself if she is not able to be happy solely by making her husband happy.
We first learn that Richard calls Clarissa, his ex-lover, Mrs. Dalloway because she
distracts herself from her own life and what she wants out of it by preoccupying herself with
making him happy and swearing this makes her happy. Richard calls her this because Mrs.
Dalloway also distracts herself from addressing what she needs out of life by focusing her
attention onto making the male character feel cared for and valued. Clarissa feels as though
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Richard is dependent on him but in reality, Clarissa is dependent on feeling needed. We see
Clarissa bringing Richard flowers, a direct reflection of Leonard’s attempt to cheer Virginia up,
and Richard tells Clarissa that people only admire him for barely surviving AIDS. He tells her, “I
think I’m only staying alive to satisfy you” after asking, “Would you be mad if I died?” In an
attempt to remind her that she has not been living for herself, he says, “Just wait ‘till I die, then
you’ll have to think of yourself.” We learn that in the book which he is famous for writing, his
mother, Laura kills herself but that he created this reality out of spite towards his mother who we
learn was unable to sacrifice her happiness to be the mother he needed.
Ahmed’s description of the way in which people attribute happiness to trivial items
directly relates to the way in which both Laura and Clarissa aim to bring joy to their partners.
Each ultimately end up in a state of debilitating disappointment, insecurity, and existential fear
about having no control over happiness when the thing they expected to bring them happiness
failed to do so. Ahmed writes, “To follow the paths of happiness is to inherit the elimination of
the hap” meaning to secure one’s fate as determined is to seize control over happiness by
following that which “promises” happiness or increases the probability of happiness as opposed
to leaving it to chance (581). Ahmed adds, “Your rage might be directed against the object that
fails to deliver its promise or it may spill out toward those who promised you happiness through
the elevation of some things as good” (581). In the case of Laura Brown, set in the 1950s with
young Richie, her son, (the same Richard seen in Clarissa’s modern story) the trivial object
which she believes will make her husband happy, and in turn will make her happy, is the
birthday cake for her husband’s birthday. The elaborate cake plan represents domestic mastery
which is something that Laura struggles with. She tells another housewife in the neighborhood,
Kitty, “Our husband’s came home from the war. They deserve all this.” Kitty laughs at Laura for
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being stressed and miserable about making the cake but it quickly becomes apparent that while
Kitty can bake and clean, she physically cannot birth children like Laura can and this distresses
her. She tells Laura, “I’ve always been able to do everything except the one thing I wanted”
meaning being able to conceive and the viewer begins to wonder if it is what she truly wants or if
she feels shame and anger towards herself as a deficient woman for not being able to bear
children for her husband.
Even though Kitty tells Laura that her husband will love the cake no matter how it comes
out, Laura desperately tries to prove her worth and also prove to herself that she can be happy
with this life that was chosen for her by tossing her first attempt and beginning a second, more
perfect cake after telling Richie, “We have to show Daddy we love him.” In response to Richie’s
question, “He won’t know we love him unless we make the cake?” she answers, “yes.” In the
context of Ahmed’s analysis of our association between objects and happiness, Laura first
becomes disappointed with the cake for not being perfect for fear that it will not guarantee her
husband happiness and therefore will not guarantee her happiness. Next, she becomes
disappointed with herself for being inadequate as a housewife and seriously contemplates
suicide. She expresses feeling like an imposter, as if the person she was before being a housewife
and truly still is, is in a distant universe, inaccessible so long as she exists in this one. Ahmed
writes,
Feminist archives are thus full of housewives becoming conscious of unhappiness as a
mood that seems to surround them: think of Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway… ‘this body,
with all its capacities, seemed nothing-…She had the oddest sense of being herself
invisible; unseen… this being Mrs. Dalloway; not even Clarissa anymore; this being Mrs.
Richard Dalloway.’…Becoming Mrs. Dalloway is itself a form of disappearance following
the paths of life (marriage, reproduction) so that you feel that what is before you is a kind
of solemn progress, as if you are living somebody else’s life…If happiness is what allows
us to reach certain points, it is not necessarily how we feel when we get there…The point
of reaching these points…[is] a loss of possibility (585).
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Laura becomes disappointed with her husband for talking about how he “discovered” her as a
nerdy reader and made a housewife out of her. She does not show him her sadness because the
joy she displays in servicing his joy, brings him joy and this gap makes her panic that she
sacrificed everything in the pursuit of what Ahmed calls “alignment” (580). Laura looks around
the kitchen, at her pristine home full of kitchen appliances she never wanted, at her own unsteady
hands clearly made for holding books and not decorating cakes as if she is living a nightmare.
This end goal, a life of luxury, having a roof and cooking supplies provided to her by a husband
was promised to bring her more happiness than loneliness. However, she feels trapped now,
static in a life she was promised she would grow accustomed to but realizes it is never what she
wanted. According to Ahmed, not only do “we become alienated when we do not experience
pleasure from proximity to objects that are attributed as being good” but also, “the failure to be
happy is read as sabotaging the happiness of others” (580, 582). As previously discussed in the
context of the killjoy, Ahmed’s idea of the “shared atmosphere,” which would be the happy
home that Laura’s husband imagines he has gallantly provided for her, would be ruined by Laura
challenging the existence and applicability of one model of joy by pointing to its faults or her
inability to be happy with this lifestyle (582). Immensely overwhelmed by the birthday party
preparations and what her failure to be happy about it represents, Laura comes incredibly close to
killing herself but chooses not to because Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway gets a second chance at life
once she finds her own self-defined joy.
Ahmed relates this anti-feminist suppression of a woman’s aspirations towards her own
definition of happiness and her right to something other than what will directly bring happiness
to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile. The passage Ahmed pulls reveals that the seemingly goodintentioned expectation that one’s loved-one will find happiness is actually coercive and
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burdensome. In Emile, Sophy’s father tells her, “We [Sophy’s parents] want you to be happy, for
our sakes as well as yours, for our happiness depends on yours. A good girl finds her own
happiness in the happiness of a good man” (Rousseau 434 as cited in Ahmed 579). Just as
Laura’s husband chose what he thought would make her happiest, which was pulling her away
from a lonely life spent reading and truth-seeking, Virginia tells her husband Leonard that her
life was “stolen” from her and that in his attempt to make her happy and calm by isolating her
from London, she has felt trapped and drained of her ability to write in the countryside. While
London represents freedom and less supervision, it also represents raw truth and chaos. Even if it
brings her unhappiness, she expresses feeling that this unhappiness would be worth the meaning
she finds in the stimulus and the awakening. Just as Woolf states in A Room of One’s Own that
genius comes from grasping the whole moment truly, no matter how ugly it may be, she is
portrayed in The Hours as having finally tapped into her genius once she decides to take a trivial
object, flowers, -usually utilized by men to bring women happiness-and reclaim its power. She
writes her first sentence of Mrs. Dalloway: “Mrs. Dalloway decided to by the flowers herself”
and subsequently lifts the burden off of Leonard so that he does not have to solely buy them for
her so that she won’t kill herself and cease to bring him happiness.
It can be questioned whether or not men even buy flowers to make women truly happy or
whether they are commonly given as an apology; a means of saying “I upset you but since I am
unwilling to change my ways to avoid upsetting you again in the future, please tell me these
multicolor weeds make you happy-since women are supposed to like them- so that I can feel
better about myself.” In this scenario, if a woman is still unhappy after the gift of flowers, she is
ungrateful and pathological since she does not find joy from an object that is supposed to bring
her joy. This way, her dissatisfaction can be no fault but her own if she is supposedly incapable
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of doing what is expected of her. In order to appease her and bring her health, considering
Virginia tried to kill herself in London, Leonard brings her flowers, maids, luxury, and a quiet
space to write, -all things he thinks a sane woman wants- despite her wanting none of it. Leonard
calls Virginia ungrateful for all he has sacrificed in order to bring her peace and health but
feeling like he sees her best interests as merely a reflection of his, she writes, “My life has been
stolen from me. Only I can understand my own condition. This is my life. If I should choose
between Richmond [the countryside] and death, I choose death.” Woolf writes in A Room of
One’s Own how when men write about women’s lives, they do not resemble women’s lives
whatsoever and rather have a deeply fantastical approach to what they believe makes them
happy. Ahmed writes, “Feminists… disturb the very fantasy that happiness can be found in
certain places” that being a domestic life for Laura imagined by her husband, a peaceful country
home for Virginia imagined by Leonard and a celebratory party for Richard imagined by Clarissa
(582).
For all three women, it becomes apparent to the viewer that happiness is a critique of the
world rather than a pathology of the self. We see that this is not just a dated experience for
women when Clarissa’s own struggles with happiness in 2001 greatly reflect those of her sisters’
from decades prior. In addition to bringing the flowers to Richard, the object which Clarissa
believes will bring Richard happiness and therefore her happiness is “the crab thing” which he
apparently likes. Just as Laura becomes enraged at the cake, Clarissa becomes visibly furious at
how difficult the crab dish is to make, despite her being the one who decided to make it.
Immensely overwhelmed by the party preparations, she breaks down in tears, displaying the fact
that all of this effort is for Richard and that it is ultimately futile because she cannot make him
happy, only she can make him happy, and that this party is not what he wants but is rather what
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she thinks he wants. Richard does not show up to Clarissa’s party and when she goes to his
apartment, he lovingly tells her she needs to be freed then jumps out the window before her eyes.
In the end, Virginia chose to live and die her way, not according to how Leonard thinks
will make her happiest. She chooses to kill herself so that Leonard can live fully without
sacrificing his happiness to make her happy in the way he thinks is best. She ultimately sacrifices
herself in order to make him happy. Virginia was alienated from happiness and could not make
Leonard happy being herself but ended up having to die in order to free him. In the end of
Clarissa’s story, she chooses to go home to her girlfriend and live in the present instead of
distracting herself constantly. She feels similarly to how Richard’s ex-lover felt once he left
Richard in that both of them expressed no longer feeling the burden of sacrificing their lives to
desperately attempt to keep Richard happy. Additionally, Richard kills himself in the end so that
Clarissa could live fully and so that he could no longer serve as an excuse for her to falsely
describe this one-sided relationship as sacrificial love. Like Virginia, Richard was alienated from
happiness because he could not make Clarissa happy by being himself. Both Leonard and
Clarissa had expectations of their respective partners and were dependent on the happiness of the
other. Unlike both of their tales however, Laura’s did not end in tragedy, at least not for her.
Laura ultimately chooses to live without her family to free her husband from the burden of
attempting to make her happy when she knew that she would never be happy in a domestic
lifestyle. Inspired by Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, she chooses to create her own happiness and
follow her love of books. She later explains her decision to Clarissa, following her son Richard’s
suicide, “What does it mean to regret when you have no choice? It [housewifery and
motherhood] was death. I chose life.” Her ultimate decision, which could be characterized as a
what Marso calls a perverse protest, demonstrates freedom within restrictive circumstances and
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points to the concept that without full freedom, any grasp for individual happiness would be
perceived as threatening to the ruling class. A classic killjoy, Laura is ultimately successful in
escaping the mutual dependency of marriage and motherhood so as to follow imagination as a
librarian, which in turn, brought her immense joy.
The image of the sacrificing mother not only objectifies the woman but punishes her for
her individuality the moment she creates another human. Haraway writes,
MacKinnon argues that feminism [looked at] the structure of sex/gender and its generative
relationship, men’s constitution and appropriation of women sexually. Ironically,
MacKinnon’s ontology constructs a non-subject, a non-being. Another’s desire, not the
self’s labor, is the origin or ‘woman.’ She…enforces what can count as ‘women’s
experience-anything that names sexual violation … (6)
Haraway sees this construction of the woman as a self-less object as hazardous to female selfactualization. She feels that to argue for this definition of the woman as exploited is to say that
she was always an object to begin with. That being said, it is incorrect to argue that sexual
appropriation is alienation from the rightful ownership of her product, her sexuality, in the same
way that class exploitation is alienation of the worker from his labor. She essentially is saying
that Marx’s theory of the class struggle is no longer comparable to this feminism’s theory of
sex/gender in that “a woman is not simply alienated from her product, but in a deep sense does
not exist as a subject, or even potential subject, since she owes her existence as a woman to
sexual appropriation. To be constituted by another’s desire is not the same things as to be
alienated in the violent separation of the laborer from his product” (6). Haraway argues that
building a collective or even individual consciousness based on this definition of feminism is
inherently self-victimizing and self-objectifying.
Similarly, Firestone discusses how idealization and romanticization of mothers as perfect
beings due to their sacrificial selflessness not only punishes women who want to have sex and
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live for themselves but also punishes mothers who deviate from this restrictive model. She
discusses how the incest taboo, which was constructed in order to reinforce development within
the family structure, actually leads to “an unnatural psychological dichotomy [between]
…good/bad women” (54). This enables the development of the Madonna-whore complex in
which those that resemble one’s mother is deserving of love and respect whereas those that do
not are undeserving of this type of adoration but rather are deserving of lowly treatment as a
means of reinforcing that these women will never be loved like the individual loves the mother.
Firestone writes, “If the child is to gain his mother’s love he must separate out the sexual from
his other feelings…mothers are ‘good’…those unlike the mother…are sexual, and therefore
‘bad.’ Whole classes of people e.g. prostitutes, pay with their lives for this dichotomy” (54). This
refusal to devote emotion and adoration to women who are unlike one’s mother is based on the
fear that if one puts energy and faith into another woman again, after the mother, he will be
rejected once again, like he was when his mother chose his father.
When a mother expresses happiness needs which are at odds with the happiness needs of
the child, especially at junctions of growth, change, and consequent detachment, the mother is
villainized until the child becomes an adult and becomes able to see their mother as a fully
formed humans with her own emotional needs beyond those of the child.

The Mother Daughter Relationship According to Akerman: From Sacrificial to Mutual Love

Both of Akerman’s films News from Home and No Home Movie highlight the contrast
between separation and connection, anonymity with personal closeness, activity with inactivity,
the foreign with the familiar, and isolation with closeness. There is also an overarching theme of
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happiness in both films and the relationship between mother and daughter evolves from a
sacrificial, one-sided one in News from Home to a more reciprocal happiness in which the mother
does not have to be unhappy for her daughter to be happy nor does the mother only gain
happiness from her daughter’s happiness. Chantal expresses the tension in her own relationship
with her mother in these films and shows the growth the two of them experience in which
Chantal, the daughter, becomes better able resent her mother less for having happiness needs
which were dependent on Chantal’s happiness and the two women become better able to see
each other as equals.
News from Home begins with the camera’s and therefore the viewer’s perspective at New
York City street level which elicits a feeling of anxiety which parallels the emotions conveyed
through Chantal’s mother’s letters. The view is one which could represent a frantic search for
Chantal, a desperate attempt to reconnect despite the sprawling landscape of the city streets and
all of its anonymous inhabitants. The shots are solely of abandoned, run-down alleyways filled
with trash and busy crowds of people who are all simultaneously preoccupied with their own
lives. This feeling of anonymity in crowds is starkly contrasted with the constant voice-overs of
Chantal’s mother’s worried letters, read by Chantal, which emphasize the mother’s pull home
from a person who knows her own daughter so well. Despite her mother’s constant attempts to
get an answer from Chantal about when she is returning home, it becomes apparent that she
chooses this separation because of the opportunity and thrill associated with it. It appears to
maintain more appealing to Chantal as her mother’s letters progress that the personal closeness
that her mother describes as needing for her sanity, Chantal does not need at this stage in her life.
The viewer begins to get the feeling that her mother’s means of persuasion-explaining
how everyone in the hometown asks about her, loves her, and has known her since she was a
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child-may actually be pushing this evolving young woman further and further away from a place
that may be beginning to feel less and less like home. Jennifer Barker discusses how “Akerman
bypasses the well-known picture-postcard sites and landmarks, and instead seeks out and
inhabits the ‘lived’ spaces of everyday life, with which the city’s residents would be more
intimately familiar” (42). Akerman’s choice to show “the city’s more “anonymous spaces” offers
an interesting commentary on the concept of home (42). Shots of massive apartment buildings
with hundreds of windows, each home to families, friends, mothers, daughters, and struggling
artists just like Chantal give the viewer a look into what Chantal is seeing and what she may be
feeling as a result. Some viewers may feel comforted by being surrounded by densely populated
spaces but others may feel incredibly isolated and lost by such images. Barker considers how
Akerman’s “attention paid to urban space and the act of dwelling leads to a discovery of ‘home’
within what appears to be ‘homelessness’” (42). Despite knowing from her mother’s letters that
Chantal has moved a number of times, which gets in the way of her mother’s ability to literally
send her mail and symbolically keep tabs on her baby, the viewer has an uncertain idea about
who Chantal is, by her own definition, by not knowing where she is. Additionally, with this
separation, both Chantal feels homeless as she tears herself from the home she always known
and her mother becomes homeless when the very thing that first defined her identity as a mother,
Chantal, is torn from her. Barker writes, “That Akerman speaks her mother’s words in English is
a sign of the distance between the child and the mother, but Akerman’s strong Belgian accent
reinforces a shared loneliness. Her mother is, in a sense, ‘homeless’ in the Brussels family home
after the departure of her daughter; Akerman is ‘homeless’ in Manhattan” (44). This strong
connection is displayed through the ambiguity of self and speaker that comes from the mother’s
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words being spoken by Akerman who is in fact, Chantal considering these letters were actually
sent to her in 1972.
The difficult reality of New York City and its images, which would probably send
Chantal’s mother into a panicked frenzy, strongly contrast with her mother’s expectations for her
daughter’s happiness. In reality, Chantal’s mother is incapable of being unhappy unless she
knows her daughter is happy, even if it means their separation, but it becomes clear that this
sacrificial motherly ideal is actually quite difficult for her mother to achieve. This is displayed by
her mother’s frustration and anger towards her daughter when Chantal does not fulfill her
mother’s needs by meeting her expectations of closeness whether that be writing frequently,
answering questions about her quality of life, or making plans to come home. A voiceover of her
mother’s letter reading, “We hope you become famous. We’re not mad you left without notice.
We’re happy you’re getting along so well” is contrasted with images of poverty stricken New
York streets, showing that Chantal may not be telling her mother about her difficulty with
achieving success and luxury synonymous to what she would receive at home so as not to upset
her. Her mother’s façade of sacrificial happiness for her daughter is not entirely believed
considering almost every letter also includes mention of how the whole family is in poor health,
is miserable without her, or is in frightening economic decline. It is almost as if the mother
subconsciously wants her daughter to feel guilty for not being there for the mother after
everything the mother has done for her. The letters in the beginning mention things such as how
concerned the mother is that her daughter has not written back and how Chantal wrote so
frequently when she first left and now only writes once a week. The detachment between the two
is tangibly felt by the viewer as it grows with each passing day and with less and less
communication. Also, the fact that Akerman only reads the mother’s letters out loud in the film
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and we never hear any of Chantal’s response letters shows how much more energy the mother is
putting into maintaining this threatened connection than Chantal is and it also shows that despite
the frequency and content of Chantal’s responses, nothing will ever be enough to satisfy her
mother who truly just wants her home in her arms.
We hear the ways in which the distance has taken a toll on the family’s body and psyche
and Chantal’s mother does not hold back in describing the consequences her lack of letters has
on her family’s health. Her mother writes, “My exhaustion and fatigue are getting worse,”
repeatedly writes on different occasions, “You know I live for your letters. I’m so lonely…Write
more, it’s all I have left” and also mentions how her sister Sylviane has dreams that Chantal
comes home and how Chantal’s father had a nightmare that she came home then left again and
“woke up anxiously” and was depressed the whole next day. It almost seems as if Chantal’s
mother expects that these mentions of their poor condition will cause her to write more but she
does not and this elicits a bipolar response in the mother. We hear her struggling, frequently
within the same letter to be honest about how terribly she feels that her daughter isn’t taking time
to write her and respect her wishes and also to eagerly apologize, be sweet, and make sure she
does not push Chantal away even further.
She writes things that are nagging and resemble a lecture then gives the little money and
energy she has left to Chantal to make sure she is okay and mentions how she is being a good
mother so as to make sure Chantal does not resent her. Her mother writes, “Don’t go out alone at
night, New York is dangerous…Write more” but then sends summer clothes and money
accompanying a letter saying, “anxiously awaiting your letter, tell me when you get the
money…What matters most is that you’re happy.” We really see the conflict within the mother
towards the end of the film when we hear Akerman reading her mother’s letter, still voiced-over
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ragged city streets of New York. We hear her write, “For the umpteenth time, did you get the
twenty dollars I sent last week? You never answer my questions and it’s bothering me…You’re
going to miss Sylviane’s birthday party but I’d rather you stay then come and regret it. I don’t
expect to see you anytime soon.” Despite the increasingly depressed, passive aggressive, and
cynical tone in her letters, she always finishes each letter by saying that her, “Daddy,” and
Sylviane love her and then writes a letter later saying “I won’t be sad even if you don’t come
home soon. I want you to be happy and don’t want to be a selfish mother.” We hear the mother
self-correcting to act like a better mother or the type of mother she feels is worthy of respect
even if she is struggling desperately to fit this sacrificial ideal. The viewer is made to feel the
mother’s desperation as we wait, impatiently, throughout the whole movie to finally see Chantal
on screen or even hear her voice in a return letter but never do. We know that she is returning her
mother’s letters but because we are only fed one side, her mother’s, the viewer cannot help but
become frustrated with Chantal too and find ourselves asking, “Would it kill you to ease your
poor mother’s nerves?” Beauvoir discusses this expectation society holds of mothers to be
sacrificially happy for their children but also how mothers are expected to be happy when they
have children because their child’s transcendence, ability to outlive them, is the closest to
transcendence and purpose a woman will come. Beauvoir writes, “The fetus…encapsulates the
whole future, and in carrying it, she feels as vast as the world…A new existence is going to
manifest itself and justify her own existence” (538). Chantal’s mother wants her daughter to
succeed. She is thrilled that her daughter has gone further than she could have. Her mother is too
terrified of leaving her family to pursue her dreams beyond fear the way Chantal does but her
mother is able to live vicariously through her daughter even if the separation breaks her.

68
We do not know what Chantal is going through and the viewer is forced to project their
own regrets, frustrations, and pangs of heartache associated with their own mothers onto the
relationship between Chantal and her mother. The viewer begins to wonder if Chantal was
keeping her mother in the dark because the truth would break her mother’s heart. Just as a child’s
happiness is a mother’s happiness, a child’s pain and suffering is enough to drive a mother mad,
especially if she is too far away to do anything to help and even if her involvement is the last
thing a growing child wants. We see bustling active city streets, packed train cars, and buses and
cabs whizzing by in the Summer heat and hear Chantal’s mother mentioning how she knows that
the heat makes Chantal depressed. This shows a contrast between the exciting yet isolating
anonymity of the city who does not know about how temperature regulation personally affects
her mood and her mother’s personal reminders that no one will ever know Chantal, or at least
who she used to be, as well as her own mother. Barker writes how “The roar of street traffic and
the rattling of the subway at times overwhelm the filmmaker’s voice and the content of the
letters” (45). Barkers cites Margulies statement that “Random weaving of attention bolsters
Akerman’s subversion of a fixed locus for the ‘I’, as well as threatening the continuity of space,
as New York’s noise battles with Belgium’s maternal words” (45). Chantal’s voice and that of
her mother’s become one and their separate yet conjoined place in the world becomes confused
by the external sounds of the two different homes.
Perhaps to admit to her mother that she is overheated and overwhelmed will mean defeat
and will signify a failure to live independently, a win for her mother who benefits from Chantal’s
emotional dependence on her. Because she has always been around her mother, she takes this
closeness for granted because it does not hold the exciting promise of new beginnings and is a
reminder of a part of her that she needs to distance herself from in order to grow. Additionally, in
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terms of Chantal’s success with finding jobs, her mother complains, “You never write about how
you’re really doing” but the viewer can’t help but wonder, without ever being given an answer,
why Chantal is doing so. Is it because the truth about her failures would destroy her already
emotionally fragile mother? Would her failure be enough for her mother to demand she returns
home immediately where things would be easier? Just like in Akerman’s La Captive, we get very
little insight into the inner workings of the female character’s minds and they occupy the gray
area between victim and villain. Is Chantal subject to an overbearing, unreasonable mother? Is
she a rotten and ungrateful daughter? Is she both or neither?
The anxieties we are, or at least I was left with following the sorrowful view of Chantal’s
isolation from New York as she finally departs on a ship to go home in News from Home are
somewhat soothed by the evolved and more reciprocal relationship between Chantal Akerman
and her mother in No Home Movie. Additionally, the upsetting reality of our own mothers’
mortality may act as a grounding factor in No Home Movie in that Chantal’s mother is elderly
and ill. This growing realization may have contributed to a more reciprocal and close
relationship between the two in that their collective happiness is prioritized by both parties who
behave more like equals.
With age, Chantal begins to see her mother as less of a myth and as more of a relatable
human and with age the daughter becomes someone that the mother does not have to lecture,
scold, or hold high expectations of but rather becomes a respected friend, someone worth
hanging out with. In No Home Movie, both Akerman and her mother are shown in the
documentary, and as Barker discusses, it is framed as a love letter to her mother, as are almost all
of Akerman’s female-focused avant-garde films. Perhaps No Home Movie is an apology to her
mother for how she was when she was younger, as shown in News from Home, maybe it is a love
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letter to make up for her lack thereof and regret for not doing so, or maybe it’s just a love letter
marking their relationship as it is, at this stage in their lives. Barker cites Brenda Longfellow
saying that Akerman’s films are “love letters to the mother. Desire in these films circulate around
the maternal body, around the variable presence and absence of the mother…the films [act] both
as a mode of reparation and as evidence of an irreparable divide” (Barker 44). In No Home
Movie, it is clear from the beginning that this adult Chantal works tirelessly to reassure her
mother, who is not as worried, that Chantal will call, write, and visit very soon and gives a
concrete date for her mother to look forward to. Watching News from Home before watching No
Home Movie definitely gave me a concept of linear chronological progression but if News from
Home had not been watched by the viewer of No Home Movie, the viewer might have always
assumed that their relationship had always been this strong.
No Home Movie opens with the stationary camera shooting Chantal sitting with her mom
in her mom’s kitchen with Chantal’s back to the camera. Her elderly mother bluntly and jokingly
tells her to eat more because the chicken will give her muscles. In another shot, Chantal is
skyping her mother in Brussels from Oklahoma and her mom asks, “Why are you filming me?”
to which Chantal responds, “Because I want to show that there is no distance in the world…Look
there is no more distance!” You get the feeling that Akerman is filming her conversations with
her mother and them laughing and saying loving things to each other as a way of preserving
these moments forever because it is clear her elderly mother will not be around forever. Chantal
gives her mother a firm date over Skype about when she will visit next and her mother is happy
and relaxed because she is able to see Chantal and is not worried or wondering about her
daughter. Her mother may also be less worried because she now knows that Chantal is a
successful filmmaker, is financially independent, and therefore, her mother does not need to
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worry about her wellbeing as much. Another time when they are on Skype, Chantal’s mother
says, “You’re the one who visits the most” and when Chantal says, “I have to go. Call you later,”
her mother responds with, “You don’t have to explain. We say goodbye that’s it. The last thing I
want to do is bug you. I want us to enjoy our conversations.” With this shortened distance
courtesy of internet and increased communication comes less pressure from her mother to
contact her more frequently and less annoyance in Chantal.
When Chantal next visits, she asks her mother about her mother and tells her mother,
“Your mother was a feminist ahead of her time.” The appreciation and adoration Akerman has
for the mothers in this film starkly contrasts with the way Chantal behaved in News from Home
and you get the feeling that Akerman really wants to document the beautifully healthy arrival to
this current phase. Wanting to remember the good parts of the past and reminisce with one of the
only other people who were actually there during the hilarious and bizarre moments, they laugh
about how her mother’s father was so gentle that he had to have his wife spank the kids, how her
mother would complain that the prayers were in old Ashkenazi Hebrew and not modern Hebrew,
and would joke nostalgically about how Chantal was as a kid. Her mother teases Chantal for
never eating enough and Chantal explains that she couldn’t eat a lot when she went to Nanny’s
because the meatballs got stuck in her throat because she was so nervous as a result of her
Nanny’s crazy hair scaring her. The joy overflowed at the kitchen table as the two older women
laugh over specific memories that manage to unite the generations.
Both Chantal and her mother are looking back with the perspective of older women and
because Chantal is no longer her baby, instead of her mother forcing her to eat despite her fear,
her mother can laugh in agreement and explain that her mother looked like that because of
female ills. Menopause, diabetes, the trauma from fleeing the Holocaust were mentioned but the
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subjective experience is still lovingly honored. Chantal says, “A child sees what a child sees”
and her mother nostalgically smiles and nods in agreement. Beauvoir discusses how a woman’s
child represents a continuation of her through the generations and writes, “The separation woman
suffered from in the past during her weaning is compensated for; it is submerged again in the
current of life, reintegrated into the whole, a link in the endless chain of generations, flesh that
exists for and through another flesh” (539). The separation between the generations we saw in
News from Home appears to be repaired by Chantal’s transcendence, which gives her elderly
mother relief knowing that she can depart this earth having done her job as a mother and that a
piece of her lineage will remain in the form of Chantal and Chantal’s work.
Just as in Jeanne, Akerman’s filming of all of the mundane actions her mother does
around the house in No Home Movie show not only life through a female perspective but also
how each action is a protest and triumph accomplished by a Holocaust survivor. This film is a
love letter in that it displays all of the little things her other says and does that Akerman respects
so much, especially with an increased understanding of her mother with age. When discussing
how Chantal was raised, she recalls how her socialist father made them stop celebrating Shabbat
and attending Hebrew school but that as Jews, “we say you don’t have to love your parents, but
respect them.” Openly discussing the cultural elements that played a role in her upbringing
appears to be therapeutic and reconciliatory for both Chantal and her mother and discussing the
war definitely helps Chantal understand where her mom must have been coming from with her
irrational actions and worries.
The final shot of No Home Movie shows Chantal’s mother coughing as she falls asleep.
This feels intrusive for the viewer. When Chantal’s younger sister tries to wake her sleeping
mother up to tell a story, Chantal explains how their mother’s parents were in Poland and how
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“that’s why she’s [Chantal’s mother] is like this [so tired].” Even in her mother’s final moments,
Chantal understands her mother, justifies her actions, and not only defends but proudly displays
her mother in her most natural form. The viewer is able to experience the development of their
relationship surrounding sacrificial and mutual love and happiness by catching glimpses of the
most intimate and imperfect aspects of their lives as they pull apart then reconnect with age,
thanks to Akerman’s genius filmmaking style.

In Conclusion
Is happiness a trap? Is it even real? Pleasure, contentment, bursts of joy; these are
emotions which are felt periodically and for good reason but is the pursuit of happiness keeping
the marginalized, the unhappy, from allowing themselves to feel deeply even if it means killing
both their joy and the joy of those in their vicinity. I explored theories of both individualistic and
communalistic happiness and liberty. It is worth considering whether the U.S. constitution’s
“protection” of “everyone’s” right to the pursuit of happiness is really just a con altogether,
designed to give the impression that the system we exist in was designed to sustain long-term
happiness for anyone but solely those in control of the means through which even basic
contentment can be achieved. As Beauvoir and Marso in particular have explained the gray area
between freedom and entrapment and between joyous happiness and absolute misery, we have
been better able to acknowledge the gray area between these polarized experiences.
By appropriately recognizing the happiness which exists in places of restriction,
individuals become so much more than the object of extremist theory. We can learn a lot from
small, sudden, perverse, bittersweet, silent and mundane happiness expressions which occur in
all of the hidden feminine spaces normally not investigated by mainstream patriarchal society.
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By looking at key films in which women are shown experiencing a whole range of varying forms
of happiness, we are given an alternative perspective on what joy truly looks like, separate from
what old white rich male theorists claimed it to be.
If anything, I hope this piece provides the reader with not only an existential reanalysis of
what happiness means and feels like for them but also reassurance that there are other models to
consider. We might have to experience the pain of unhappiness in order to truly learn who we are
behind the façade of grinning-or gritting- our way through life so as to reassure those around us
that we are not insane. I invite everyone to be a feminist killjoy or at least unapologetically kill
joy where joy acts as a barrier to justice and truth. Perhaps this work has provided more
questions than answers but I find that where there is consistent curiosity, there is progression
beyond expectations both we and others have always created for ourselves. Even if the
generation to follow has access to more liberty and sustained happiness than we could have ever
dreamed of, the historic female experience, one of pain, sorrow, happiness, and ecstasy, and
everything in between will always need to be remembered and documented as such. Yes, women
want to be happy but they want the choice to define what happiness means for them and if it is
even a priority to begin with. I hold that all individuals should have the right to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of any form of happiness or unhappiness which their heart desires. In response to
Sigmund Freud’s famous question “What do women want?” I answer: Well, we want everything.
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